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THE  INDEXATION  OF payments makes excellent sense for all sorts of 
long-term  contracts. Future  payments  should not be expressed in cur- 
rency units, but instead  tied to an index of consumer  prices or an index 
of wholesale prices, of wages, of incomes, or of components  of income. 
History  shows that  the real value of currency  units has been so unstable 
that it is better to use practically any one of these indexes to specify 
future  payments  in contracts  than  to specify payments  in terms  of fixed 
currency. 
And yet there has been relatively little use of indexation, except in 
situations  of extremely variable inflation. People seem to have a pref- 
erence for specifying their obligations and opportunities,  long-term  as 
well  as short-term, in local currency units. That the public should 
generally want to denominate  contracts  in currency  units-despite  all 
the evidence that  it is not wise to do so and  despite  the obvious examples 
from nominal contracts  of redistributions  caused by unexpected  infla- 
tion-should  be regarded  as one of the great economic puzzles of all 
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time.  The  success  of  the U.S.  Treasury's  first issuance  of  consumer 
price-indexed  debt in January 1997 does virtually nothing to diminish 
the salience  of this puzzle. 
It is the premise of this paper that the answer to the puzzle  must be 
sought  in terms  of  human  behavior  that  is  complex  and situation- 
specific,  and that many factors impinge on people's  thought processes. 
It requires serious  work to try to gain an understanding of the indexa- 
tion-resistant  mind set that gives  rise to irrational, partly rational,  and 
sometimes  even  rational  reasons  for  avoiding  indexation.  The  final 
resolution  of the puzzle  may not be simple.  The fact that resistance  to 
inflation indexation  is a worldwide  phenomenon  (at least,  where infla- 
tion risk is not enormous) does not argue against the complexity  of the 
answer. People are both very complex  and at the same time very similar 
to one  another.  There is,  moreover,  a well-developed  global  culture, 
emphasized  by  sociologists,  that encourages  similar  thinking  on  nu- 
merous issues. ' 
In this paper,  I first outline  the argument that indexation  is  advis- 
able-in  case there is any doubt-and  indicate its historical precedents. 
Next,  I describe  the current extent  of  indexation  in the United  States 
and Turkey.  Turkey is chosen  for comparison  with the United  States 
because  it continues  to have very high and variable inflation (it has not 
reduced  inflation  in  recent  years,  as  have  many  other high-inflation 
countries),  and yet the indexation  of  contracts  is rare. I then present 
results  of  a  survey  conducted  in  these  two  countries,  by  means  of 
interviews  and questionnaires,  designed  to explain  why people  are re- 
sistant to indexation.  Identical questions  (except  for translation) were 
asked in both countries. 
I regard the results  of  this endeavor  as only  partially successful  in 
illuminating  the nature of  public  resistance  to indexation.  I conclude 
with some general thoughts about this issue and offer a partial resolution 
of the puzzle. 
The Importance of Indexation 
Through much of history, price levels have been notoriously unstable 
over  long  periods  of  time.  Table  1 shows  the standard deviations  of 
1. See, for example, Featherstone  (1990). Robert  J. Shiller  161 
Table 1. Statistics on Inflation  and Real Per Capita Growth, Selected Countries- 
Percentage  points,  except as indicated 
Standard deviation of  Standard deviation of 
inflationb  growthc 
Ten-year  Twenty-year  Ten-year  Twenty-year  Inflation-growth 
Country  intervals  intervals  intervals  intervals  correlationd 
Argentina  4.0  x  10"  1.1 X  1012  16.0  20.9  -0.48 
Brazil  5.2  x  10I  5.3  x  10'0  30.1  29.7  -0.31 
Canada  39.5  74.5  11.8  12.8  0.26 
Chile  3.1  X 105  4.7  x  106  14.1  15.3  -0.58 
France  46.5  94.7  16.1  30.5  -0.71 
Germany  (West)  15.1  19.2  20.1  37.6  -0.47 
India  43.5  108.5  14.9  19.1  -0.18 
Indonesia  1.7 x  105  1.3 x  106  25.0  25.0  -0.73 
Italy  125.1  346.2  17.8  35.6  -0.80 
Japan  34.4  42.2  42.2  102.4  0.02 
Korea  135.7  618.7  34.1  54.4  -0.19 
Mexico  4,291.3  2.6  x  104  18.1  26.0  -0.83 
Nigeria  213.7  692.6  66.1  51.2  -0.31 
Turkey  1,926.2  3.6  x  104  14.1  15.8  -0.61 
United  Kingdom  83.4  174.4  4.7  6.5  -0.77 
United  States  32.3  60.5  7.8  8.6  -0.42 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Penn World Tables, mark  5.6 (accessed on the worldwide web page 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research). 
a.  For a given  country. the standard deviation of  inflation or growth is the standard deviation of an annual series of 
overlapping ten- or twenty-year percentage changes (not annualized). For most countries, the overlapping intervals span the 
period 1950-92.  so that the first ten-year interval is  1950-60  and the last is 1982-92;  the exceptions are Argentina ( 1950- 
90).  Indonesia (1960-92).  and Korea (1953-91). 
b. Inflation is measured as the percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator. 
c. Growth is measured as the percentage change in real per capita GDP. 
d. Correlation between series of overlapping ten-year inflation and growth intervals. 
ten-  and twenty-year  percentage  changes  in  price  levels  for  sixteen 
countries.  The standard deviations  of  long-term  inflation rates can be 
interpreted as measures  of  uncertainty about inflation over  long  hori- 
zons.  Almost  no econometrician  presumes to forecast inflation beyond 
a few  years;  the  uncertainty  is  truly enormous.  Even  in  the  United 
States,  where  inflation  uncertainty  is  very  low  by  international  stan- 
dards,  it has  made  long-term  nominal  debt very  risky  in real terms. 
Jeremy Siegel  points  out that in the United  States,  long-term govern- 
ment bonds have been even riskier than stocks in terms of real twenty- 
year returns.2 Inflation has been very unstable for many advanced and 
2.  Siegel (1994, p. 34). His sample  period is 1802-1992. 162  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, I. 1997 
otherwise  exemplary  countries.  One  could,  in fact,  say  that only  in 
Germany has there been no substantial uncertainty about price levels. 
And there has not been any substantial change in constitutions  or mon- 
etary technology  since  these  data were  collected  to indicate  that this 
historical experience  is no longer relevant. 
To put these numbers into perspective,  one should recognize  that it 
does  not take large changes  in annual inflation rates to achieve  large 
changes  in the price  level  over ten or twenty  years.  Suppose,  for ex- 
ample,  that for the next twenty years the inflation rate is equally likely 
to average 2 percent and 4 percent-or  about plus or minus 1 percentage 
point from current levels,  a range that is often  seen between  different 
professional  forecasts  of inflation for just one year ahead. Then prices 
are equally likely  to rise by 49 percent and 119 percent in twenty years. 
Table  1 also  shows  the standard deviations  of ten- and twenty-year 
changes  in real per capita gross domestic  product for the sixteen  coun- 
tries.  Comparison of the data in the table reveals that while  both infla- 
tion  and real  income  are unstable  (and both  risks  should  ideally  be 
hedged),  the inflation rate has been far more unstable.  Because  of the 
swings  in real income,  it can be argued that many payments  (such  as 
social  security)  should  be  indexed  in  terms  of  an aggregate  income 
index  rather than a price  index.3  The  puzzle  that this  paper tries  to 
understand is the public's  lack of interest in either form of indexation. 
In general,  in a long-term contract neither side benefits from speci- 
fying payments in terms of units of currency, since neither side benefits 
from pure random shocks.  When there is great uncertainty about the 
future direction  of prices,  both debtors and creditors benefit from in- 
dexation.  When contracts are not indexed,  if inflation turns out to be 
much higher than expected,  creditors are wiped  out.  If inflation turns 
out to be much lower than expected,  debtors go bankrupt. Both of these 
potential  problems  can be prevented  simply  by indexing  the contract 
when it is first written. 
Indexing payments is virtually costless;  only a few words need to be 
added to a contract and the calculations  necessary  to implement index- 
ation  are trivial.  Because  the  indexation  calculations  are so  simple, 
there is little avenue for legal maneuvering to avoid compliance.  Since 
3.  See Shiller and Schneider  (1995), Shiller (1993), Brainard  and Dolbear  (1971), 
Fischer  (1983b), and Merton  (1983). Robert  J. Shiller  163 
indexation  is so nearly costless, one may regard  not indexing (and so 
specifying future  payments  in units  of currency)  as equivalent  to writing 
a contract  that ties future  payments  to the outcome of a horse race or a 
coin toss. Why would anyone do it? 
That payments  in long-term  contracts  should be tied to some index, 
such as a consumer  price index (CPI), has been been widely agreed  on 
by economists for over a century  and a half. According  to Irving Fish- 
er's history  of thought  on indexation,  it was advocated  in the nineteenth 
century by Joseph Lowe and G.  Poulett Scrope.4 In  1875 William 
Stanley Jevons recommended  that the indexation of private contracts 
"might be made compulsory, in the sense that every money debt of, 
say, more than three months' standing, would be varied according  to 
the tabular  standard  [index], in the absence of an express provision to 
the contrary."5  Fisher's history documents  an ever increasing  number 
of economists who advocated indexation from 1875 onward, and the 
number continues to grow. Recent advocates of inflation indexation 
include James Tobin,  Milton Friedman, Stanley Fischer,  and Zvi 
Bodie.6 
Thus the public's resistance  to indexation  is a great  puzzle. To sum 
up, the effects of inflation  on real payments are so enormous  as to be 
obvious, dealing with these problems  by writing indexed contracts  en- 
tails almost no costs in terms of computation  or legal complexity, and 
economists have been vocally advocating indexation. Some analysts 
refer to the existence of money illusion (identified  by Fisher as a ten- 
dency to confuse real and nominal  quantities)  as a puzzle, but it is not 
really  so.  It should not be surprising  that  people often make mistakes. 
What  is really puzzling is that  nearly  everyone, including  educated  and 
highly informed people, resists taking elementary steps to heed the 
experts' commonsense advice to use indexation. 
The Extent of the Puzzle 
Efforts by U.S.  economists and other opinion leaders to establish a 
standard  for the indexation  of contracts  have achieved success only for 
4.  Fisher  (1934); Lowe (1822). 
5.  Jevons (1875. p. 331). 
6.  Tobin (1971); Friedman  (1974); Fischer  (1986); Bodie (1990). 
7.  Fisher  (1928). 164  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
a limited array of contracts and often only for short time intervals.  The 
success  of their Turkish counterparts has not, despite the high inflation 
in that country,  been any more encouraging. 
The United States 
The issuance,  on January 29,  1997, of the first inflation-indexed U.S. 
federal government  bonds,  the so-called  TIPS (Treasury Inflation Pro- 
tection  Securities),  ten-year  bonds  yielding  3.449  percent,  is  widely 
described in the media as a success.8  Indeed, the experience  with these 
bonds  hints that indexed  debt might someday  be a success.  This  first 
issue has prompted a few issues of private indexed debt and has spurred 
the Chicago  Board of Trade to file for permission  to trade futures and 
options on TIPS.  But if this indexed bond issue is now,  in fact,  a clear 
success,  it is so only relative to pessimistic  expectations.  The $7 billion 
issued represents only about one-tenth of  1 percent of the U.S.  federal 
debt. More will be issued (quarterly auctions are planned),  but there is 
little evidence  of a public clamor for indexed debt.9 Treasury Secretary 
Robert Rubin described demand at the first auction as "predominantly 
institutional. "  '0 Media accounts confirm that, even though the Treasury 
kept  the  minimum  denomination  small  ($1 ,000)  to  attract individual 
investors,  retail brokers report little interest from individual investors. 
Part of the reason for the lack of immediate public interest can be found 
in the media coverage.  In general,  reports do not seem to be written to 
inspire enthusiasm in individual investors.  For example,  Consumer Re- 
ports  writes:  "As  attractive  as the  inflation-indexed  notes  appear,  it 
8.  Some people may consider  as indexed  the bonds with gold clauses (guaranteeing 
payment  in gold rather  than  dollars)  that  became  common  in the late nineteenth  century, 
when the free-silver movement  threatened  massive inflation  in the United States. But 
these were tied to another  form of money, not to a price index. Moreover,  the buying 
power of gold was quite unstable. However, there is one very early instance of true 
indexed bonds in the United States. In 1780, the State of Massachusetts  issued bonds 
tied to an index of four commodity prices; see Willard  Fisher (1913). This issue was 
refinanced  by conventional  debt in 1786. Apparently,  protecting  indexed bond holders 
from inflation  became politically difficult to sustain  at a time of widespread  discontent 
about  wartime  inflation,  sentiments  that  in Massachusetts  culminated  in Shay's Rebellion. 
9.  The second auction of TIPS, on April 8,  1997, has been described  as less suc- 
cessful than the first. This time $8 billion were sold, but at the higher yield of 3.65 
percent. 
10.  "Treasury  Auctions  Inflation-Linked  Debt," Facts ot  File News Digest,  January 
30,  1997. Robert  J. Shiller  165 
may  make  sense  to  wait  and watch  instead  of  plunging  right  in."" 
These  accounts  have emphasized  such issues  as doubts about possible 
revisions of the Consumer Price Index; the risk that because the inflation 
component of TIPS is taxable,  some bondholders may have to pay more 
in taxes on them than they receive in interest income; and the possibility 
that TIPS may be difficult  to sell  later, because  the secondary  market 
is weak.  They do not seem  to acknowledge  the superiority of indexed 
bonds over nominal bonds in terms of inflation risk; the real riskiness 
of nominal debt appears not to be an issue for them. 
There have been almost no private initiatives  to issue similar bonds, 
nor indexed  home  mortgages  or other kinds of  indexed  indebtedness. 
Irving Fisher persuaded the Rand Kardex Company, a company that he 
had helped to found, to issue indexed debt in 1925. But this first attempt 
at creating private indexed  debt in the United  States did not spur imi- 
tators. Ultimately,  "after the Rand Kardex Co. was merged in a larger 
organization  (the Remington  Rand Inc.)  this issue  was converted  into 
ordinary preferred stock  and bonds  to  gain  a wider  market than was 
possible  for  an infamiliar  form of  security."'2  J.  Huston  McCulloch 
points out that indexed debt appears to have been illegal  between  1933 
and 1977, but there have been no legal obstacles since. 1' When inflation 
picked up after 1977,  there was a small flurry of proposals  and efforts 
to establish  markets for indexed  mortgages  (for example,  by the Tim- 
bers Corporation, the Utah State Retirement System,  and the Fund for 
an Open Society)  and indexed bonds (for example,  by the Real Dollar 
Corporation and the Fund for an Open Society),  but they soon  disap- 
peared with the decline  in inflation rates after the recession  of  1981- 
82.14  The issuance  of the TIPS in January 1997 was followed,  within 
about a week,  by some  private issues  of indexed debt. The Tennessee 
Valley  Authority issued $300  million  on February 5, J. P. Morgan and 
Co.  issued  $200  million  and Toyota  Motor Credit Corporation issued 
$100  million  on February 6,  and Salomon  Inc.  issued  $450  million  in 
11.  "New Inflation-Proof  Bonds: Should They Be in Your Portfolio?", Consumer 
Reports  62, April 1997, p. 89. 
12. Fisher  (1934, p. 112). 
13. McCulloch  (1980). 
14. Fischer  (1983a) finds  no solid reasons  for the absence  of privately  issued indexed 
debt in the United  States  and instead  falls back  on two possible hypotheses:  that  borrow- 
ers' expectations  of inflation  may have been larger  than those of lenders, and that the 
uncertainty  about  inflation  was not great. 166  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
CPI-linked  debt on February  7. The Federal  Home Loan Bank System 
also issued indexed debt in the wake of the TIPS.  '1 Yet in the following 
month  and a half, the media reported  no further  indexed issues. While 
these private  issues of indexed debt are encouraging,  and  one can hope 
that a market  for privately issued indexed debt is forming, there is not 
yet any firm  evidence that  there  will be a substantial  amount  of indexed 
debt in the United States in the future. 
Even though  the United  States  has historically  experienced  relatively 
low levels of uncertainty  about  inflation  by world standards,  failure to 
index debt  has involved tremendous  redistributions  between  debtors  and 
creditors. Such redistributions  have occurred  in every period of U.S. 
history characterized  by unanticipated  inflation or deflation. For ex- 
ample, the last couple of decades of the nineteenth  century  were defla- 
tionary  times, and since people did not seem to anticipate  the deflation 
properly, debts were magnified.  Farmers  and other  debtors, borrowing 
at fixed rates, tended to go bankrupt.  Their dissatisfaction  gave rise to 
the Greenback  party, the Populist  party, and the National  Silver party, 
and was a dominant  political force in the national  elections of 1892 and 
1896. William Jennings Bryan's famous "Cross of Gold" speech in 
1896, which won him the nomination  for the presidency,  was, in effect, 
a plea for inflation in order to spare debtors who had been ruined by 
deflation. But these political movements lost their force when prices 
started  rising again after 1896. 
At the end of World  War  II, the U.S. federal  debt was exceptionally 
high (for the time) because the government  had borrowed  rapidly and 
extensively to pay for the war: in 1945 it stood at $260 billion, well 
over a year's gross national product. By  1951, just six years later, 
unanticipated  postwar inflation  had pushed the Consumer  Price Index 
up by 44 percent, meaning that 30 percent  of this debt had effectively 
been repudiated.  Much of the economic cost of the war was thrown  on 
unwitting debt holders. Likewise, whereas in 1971 a new home buyer 
faced a conventional fixed mortgage  rate of 7.7 percent, by 1981 the 
price level, measured  by the CPI, had risen by 124 percent. In effect, 
more than half of  the real debt in a long-term mortgage had been 
forgiven-and  mortgage  rates reached 16.6 percent  in 1981, reflecting 
15.  "CPI-Linked  Corporate  Debt Tops $1.0 Bln on Week," Reuters  Financial  Ser- 
vice, February  7,  1997. Robert  J. Shiller  167 
the much higher expected  inflation rates. These few examples  show the 
magnitudes of the redistributions caused by nominal contracts. 
In the United  States,  social  security payments and military pension 
plans are indexed to inflation, but private pensions  are not substantially 
indexed.  The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association  and College 
Retirement  Equities  Fund (TIAA-CREF),  the largest  private pension 
fund  in  the  country  and the  pension  provider  for  U.S.  colleges  and 
universities,  allows  its TIAA  annuitants to select  between  a standard 
and a graded annuity, of which the latter uses the Consumer Price Index 
to adjust payouts so that they remain more nearly constant in real terms. 
A standard TIAA  annuitant lost  almost 70 percent of  the value  of the 
annuity payment to inflation over the period  1970-95.  The graded an- 
nuity  was  first offered  in  1982,  and yet  by  1994  only  14 percent  of 
TIAA annuitants were choosing  this option. 16 
The TIAA graded annuity is not really indexed to inflation, it merely 
adjusts payouts so that they will  be constant in real terms through time 
if inflation  is  as expected.  The payout of  the graded annuity depends 
on the returns to funds  invested.  Therefore  when  these  funds  are in- 
vested  in fixed incomes,  there will  still be losses  if there is unexpected 
inflation. In principle,  the CREF offers better protection than the TIAA 
against  inflation,  but 61  percent of  the TIAA  and CREF life  annuity 
and minimum distribution contracts issued in 1994 were in TIAA.'7 
Alimony  and child support awards are other examples  of very long- 
term contracts.  Alimony  often  continues  until one  spouse  dies  or the 
spouse  receiving  the award remarries.  Child support awards typically 
last through the minority of the children and through their postsecondary 
education.  Since  these  contracts are often  so  long  term and represent 
such a significant  fraction of individual  incomes,  one would think that 
all of them would be indexed.  In fact, they are only very rarely indexed 
to inflation. The legal literature on indexation and alimony in the United 
States-a  literature apparently confined  to the period before  inflation 
fell  in the mid-1980s-implies  little  use  of  indexation  in alimony  or 
16. For both the loss on the standard  TIAA annuity  and the graded annuity, see 
Francis P. King, "The TIAA Graded Payment Method and the CPI," TIAA-CREF 
Research Dialogues 46,  December 1995 (available on TIAA-CREF's  worldwide web 
page). 
17. This percentage  is inferred  from  Francis  P. King, "Trends  in Selection  of TIAA- 
CREF Life-Annuity  Income Options, 1978-1994,"  TIAA-CREF  Research Dialogues 
48, July 1996, table 6 (available  on TIAA-CREF's  worldwide  web page). 168  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
child support.  18 To confirm  that  indexation  is still rare  in this arena,  my 
research assistant telephoned six divorce lawyers and asked, "What 
percent of alimony agreements  are indexed to inflation?" Four of the 
six answered  none. Two answered  that  they had seen such agreements, 
but not recently. 
Child  support  payments  are  often partially  indexed, to the extent that 
they specify that the noncustodial  parent  must pay for medical insur- 
ance, life insurance,  and  education.  However, as noted by legal scholar 
Robert  Wilson: "As judicial policy has developed, it has not required 
that similar protection  be extended to the monthly cost of raising the 
children.  .  .  . The court decree does  not require that the noncustodial 
parent  bear  his or her fair share  of the cost of future  inflation.  The court 
is cognizant of the impact  of inflation;  it has recognized  the problem  of 
increases  in the cost  of  living  for more than fifty years.  .  .  .  [Yet]  it 
seems that the courts presently include a COLA [cost of living allow- 
ance] provision to protect the child support  order from inflation only 
when the parties  have so agreed in a stipulation."  '9 Change  in the real 
value of alimony  payments  can be overcome  only by costly and  difficult 
to obtain modifications  made by divorce courts. 
Long-term  option or warrant  strike prices are only rarely indexed. 
Futures  contracts  could be designed so that  hedgers  would be protecting 
the real value of their inventories, rather  than the nominal value, but 
they never are. 
The absence of indexation schemes may also be responsible for a 
relative dearth  of fixed long-term  contracts  in the United States. If one 
is constrained to write contracts in nominal terms, then one might 
logically keep all contracts  short  or include  various  escape clauses (such 
as call provisions or refinancing  options) that effectively shorten  con- 
tracts. It is difficult to measure  the extent of benefits  that might accrue 
if long-term  contracts  defined  in fixed real terms  were widely accepted. 
Since indexation  has never been widespread,  the potential  welfare im- 
provements  that such contracts  might provide have never emerged. 
The indexation of wages became widespread in the United States 
during World War I, but was dropped  in the 1920s, a period of stable 
18. See, for example, Cynthia  C. George, "Combatting  the Effects of Inflation  on 
Alimony  and Child Support Orders," Connecticut Bar Journal 57(3),  1983, pp. 223-35. 
19. Wilson (1980, pp. 137-38). Robert  J. Shiller  169 
prices.20  It was revived in the inflation of the 1970s, but appears to have 
fallen  sharply since  the deep recession  of  1981-82,  when  firms were 
unable to cut real wages,  despite  stagflation.21  The aversion  to wage 
indexation  currently expressed  by  firms when  negotiating  with  labor 
might be interpreted as a recognition  of the importance of applying  a 
little  "grease"  to the wheels  of the labor market. Some obfuscation  of 
the stark realities  may help  people  to  accept  changes  in real income 
more easily. 
Indexation of wages  and salaries really ought to be considered  in a 
special  category,  not entirely  parallel to indexation  of the other kinds 
of  contracts  discussed  above.  Possibly,  it  appears problematical  be- 
cause  of  the  emotions  and comparisons  with  nominal  standards that 
have entered the rhetoric and politics  of wage bargaining.  The indexa- 
tion of wages  and salaries has been blamed for the structural inflation 
seen in Latin American countries.22 Moreover,  people  seem  to have a 
pathological  aversion  to seeing  wage  cuts on paper, even  though real 
wage  cuts concealed  by inflation are acceptable.23 
With the possible  exception  of  labor markets, where the use of  in- 
dexation  is clouded  by other considerations,  the history of the United 
States largely  seems  to be one of missed  opportunities for indexation. 
Turkey 
Countries that have experienced  high and variable inflation,  such as 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and Chile,  have often widely  adopted indexation for 
long-term  contracts.  This is not surprising; under such circumstances, 
the defects  of  long-term  nominal  contracts ought to be extremely  ob- 
vious.  And  yet  there are still  other countries  with  high  and variable 
inflation,  such as Turkey, that do not index to any substantial degree.24 
In 1995,  when the Turkish consumer price index showed an inflation 
rate of 88.1  percent,  only three of the 104 countries for which data are 
20.  See Fisher  (1934). 
21.  See Robert  S. Gay, "Union Settlements  and Aggregate  Wage Behavior  in the 
1980s," Daily Labor  Report  235, p. D-1, December  6,  1984. 
22.  See Cavallo (1983). 
23.  See Groshen  and Schweitzer (1995), Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry  (1996), and 
Card  and Hyslop (1997). 
24.  Inflation  in Turkey,  although  massive, has not quite reached  the hyperinflation- 
ary  proportions  seen in Argentina  or Brazil  in the past  couple  of decades. Some observers 
believe  that  it is the lack  of indexation  that  has enabled  Turkey  to avoid  real  hyperinflation. 170  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
given in the International  Monetary  Fund's  International  Financial Sta- 
tistics had higher inflation rates: Zaire, Suriname, and Russia (which 
has since tamed  the inflation). The problem  one faces in studying  high 
inflation  in the 1990s is that  most countries  that  experienced  high infla- 
tion in the postwar period have reduced it dramatically;  inflation is 
down throughout  most of the world. In Turkey, however, inflation  has 
not been below 20 percent per year since the late 1970s. It has also 
been extremely variable, as table 1 shows. All forms of indexed con- 
tracts  have been legal in Turkey  since January  1980, when  Turgut  Ozal, 
undersecretary  to Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, liberalized the 
economy. 
Certain  prices in Turkey  are now commonly quoted in U.S.  dollars 
or deutsche marks. In the newspapers  of major  cities, house prices are 
almost always advertised  in dollars. By contrast, in small towns house 
prices are mostly quoted in Turkish lira (TL). The same is true of 
apartment  rents:  large  urban  and  wealthy  areas  favor  dollars  or deutsche 
marks  and more  rural  areas, Turkish  lira. The prices of commercial  real 
estate and expensive electronic goods are often set in dollars. Overall, 
though, the great majority  of prices are set in Turkish  lira. 
Currency  exchanges are widespread  in Istanbul, about as common 
as fast food restaurants.  Many people carry U.S.  dollars or deutsche 
marks, but instead of paying in these foreign currencies, they convert 
them into Turkish  lira at the last possible minute, even for small ex- 
penditures.  In some cases, a person  may  even exchange  currency  before 
going to the movies. 
The Turkish government had never issued inflation-indexed  debt 
before late February  1997, when the equivalent  of U.S. $148.9 million 
was issued to the public.25  Turkish  news media have apparently  shown 
little interest, and there was reportedly  "low participation"  in the is- 
sue.26  In April 1994, as part  of a stabilization  program,  the government 
25.  The Turkish  government  unsuccessfully  attempted  to market  indexed bonds in 
1996. 
26.  One explanation offered by the media for the poor showing of the Turkish 
indexed  bonds  runs  as follows: "Inflation  and  political  woes also hampered  the treasury's 
sale of two-year  inflation-indexed  bonds.  .  .  'The timing  of the first  inflation-indexed 
bond auction was not good. Political uneasiness, higher-than-expected  inflation  data, 
falling stocks, rising bond yields lowered demand  for the auction,' said a private  bank 
treasurer."  (Tulin Aygunes, "Turkish  Bond Yields Jump  on Politics, Inflation," Reu- Robert  J. Shiller  171 
advised banks to create one-year time deposits linked to the Turkish 
wholesale price index ("TEFE"). Turkish  banks  now advertise, along- 
side a variety of nominal  interest  rate accounts, these TEFE  +  savings 
accounts. 
To gauge the status of indexation in Turkey, my research  assistant 
Emre Deliveli interviewed a number  of people in Istanbul, including 
ten lawyers who handle  divorce cases, ten bond  dealers, and  three  labor 
union officials. These interviews  reveal that indexation  is almost never 
used for alimony or child support  payments, corporate  bonds, or labor 
contracts. Instead, the problems  caused in nominal contracts  by infla- 
tion are dealt with by effectively keeping the contracts  short. Alimony 
and child support payments are regularly modified by their courts, 
despite the costs and conflicts, just as in the United States. Debt and 
labor contracts  are for the short term. 
When  asked  about  public  resistance  to indexation,  Turkish  interview- 
ees were not often clear. Sometimes they cited mistrust  of the price 
index and concerns that even if the index were correct, people might 
not be able to pay the higher  payments  resulting  from indexation.  None 
of them knew of any tax disadvantages  to indexation. Some said that 
lack of understanding  is not an issue; everyone understood  indexation 
perfectly well. 
Respondents  judged that dollarization  is used for about 10 percent 
of alimony and  child support  settlements,  particularly  for more  wealthy 
clients, but that corporate  bonds and labor contracts  are not dollarized 
at all. One explanation  offered as to why dollarization  is not used more 
widely is that  the exchange  rate  has been unstable.  One respondent  said 
that  the Turkish  lira fell from 9,000 to the dollar  to 40,000 to the dollar 
in a matter  of days. While this statement  is an exaggeration  (it took a 
couple of years, not days), the real buying power of the U.S.  dollar 
has, in fact, been very variable  in Turkey. For example, according  to 
government  CPI and exchange rate figures, it increased  by 57 percent 
between 1993 and 1994. The resultant  change in local real values in a 
dollarized  contract  would have been enormous. 
ters Financial  Service, March  4,  1997.) The government  has issued small quantities  of 
debt  tied to foreign  exchange  in the past, starting  with the Turkish  Prime  Ministry  Public 
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Addressing the Puzzle 
It would seem to be easy to tell why nobody is interested in indexa- 
tion: just  ask your neighbor.  The answers  should be immediate.  And 
yet the economics  profession  apparently does  not have a good  under- 
standing of the issue.  It is the thesis  of this paper that the reasons for 
the  lack  of  public  interest  in  indexation  are not  so  easily  discerned. 
People  do not initially  remember how they have arrived at their opin- 
ions;  one  must work with them.  What may,  at first,  seem  to be  gut- 
level  prejudices  or impulsive  rejections  ultimately  derive from a con- 
stellation of views  and assumptions,  the full implications of which must 
be worked out before one can achieve  real understanding. 
Informal Interviews 
The first step in addressing the puzzle  of public resistance to index- 
ation was  to obtain an informal impression  of  public opinion  through 
personal interviews.  A dozen Yale University  students selected  people 
in  the  New  Haven  area at random to  interview  about inflation.  The 
students  called  random listings  in the telephone  book  and also  inter- 
viewed  passers-by  in a shopping  mall,  students in a vending  machine 
area at a Yale  library, workers striking Yale University  on the street, 
and the employees  of a local restaurant, several of whom were Turkish. 
Some  students also did some  library research on views  on indexation. 
I met with the students,  individually  and in groups,  every  week  or so 
for  a semester  to  discuss  what we  were  learning  and to hammer out 
questions  for formal questionnaires.  This  informal interview  stage  of 
the project was very important, for we listened to the issues that people 
brought up and were able to pose follow-up  questions; that is, to pursue 
their lines of argument. It also made for much improved questionnaires, 
since we got an advance look at people's  reactions to the questions  and 
whether they were misinterpreting them. 
One of the most striking findings from the responses to the informal 
interviews  is that many,  though by no means all,  people  seem to have 
a visceral  resistance  to  indexation:  they  trust dollars,  not formulas. 
Several respondents said,  "I want to know how much money I will  be 
getting. "  It  was  also  commonly  said  that  "the  indexed  plan  is  too 
risky,"  as if people  regard the prospect  of  getting  fewer  dollars  as a Robert  J. Shiller  173 
bad outcome, even though this would occur only if prices were also 
low.27  But much more than such impulse reactions must be at work to 
prevent any substantial  public acceptance  of indexation. 
Questionnaire  Design 
The second step of the project  was to design formal questionnaires. 
Many of the questions that I wanted to ask about indexation  could not 
be asked without posing leading questions, which suggested concepts 
that might not otherwise be on people's minds. Therefore, in order  to 
discern whether  people were merely being very agreeable, two sets of 
questions  were used in the United States, questionnaires  A and  B. Most 
questions appear  on both, but with different, often opposite, wording. 
Only questionnaire  A was used in Turkey, since this is sufficient for 
international  comparison. 
Some questions are included in both questionnaires  A and B with 
identical wording. In these cases, the ordering  of the multiple choice 
answers  is always reversed  in questionnaire  B, except for the no opinion 
category, which is always last. In the discussion below, the ordering 
shown for these questions is that of questionnaire  A. Some questions 
cannot be translated  into Turkish  literally because of the different  con- 
ditions in Turkey, notably, the much higher inflation. Below, any sub- 
stantial  differences are indicated  in square  brackets.  I discuss the ques- 
tions in the order in which they appear  on the questionnaires,  not in 
order  of importance. 
Random  samples from all over the United States, derived  from tele- 
phone books, were purchased  from Survey Sampling, Inc., and a ran- 
dom sample  from the town of Marmaris,  Mugla, Turkey,  was extracted 
from the local telephone book. Marmaris  lies on the west coast of 
Turkey, a region with somewhat  higher  levels of income and  education 
than the national  average. 
For each of the three types of questionnaire- "USA-A,"  "Tur- 
key,"  and "USA-B"-four  hundred  copies were initially mailed out 
with a letter explaining the social purpose  of the survey and informing 
participants  that their responses might help to formulate  public policy 
toward  indexation. A few weeks later, a second letter and replacement 
27.  Fisher (1928,  1934) makes similar observations  about public reactions  to pro- 
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questionnaire was sent out to all who had not responded to the first. In 
the United States,  a third letter and replacement questionnaire were sent 
out to those  still failed  to respond. 
There  were  140  responses  (35  percent)  to  questionnaire  A  in  the 
United  States,  161  responses  (40  percent)  to  questionnaire  B  in  the 
United  States,  and 99  (25  percent)  responses  to  questionnaire  A  in 
Turkey, giving  a total of four hundred responses,  or an overall response 
rate of  one-third.  There were  fewer  responses  in Turkey because  the 
questionnaire  was only  mailed twice.  The response  rate is not as high 
as one would like but, given  the difficulty  of the questionnaire and the 
subject matter, one might not be able to do better. 
The characteristics of the respondents are shown in table 2. The level 
of education  is high.  It is possible  that it would be difficult  to survey 
the opinions  of the uneducated,  less  sophisticated  fraction of the pop- 
ulation.  Perhaps the opinions  of  the more educated  and sophisticated 
people  are most salient,  since  they tend to be the opinion  leaders and 
to advise  friends  and relatives  who  are less  informed  about contracts 
and investments. 
Money Illusion  and the Framing  of Questions 
It should be noted at the outset that money illusion  is one factor that 
reduces  interest  in  indexation.  Fisher  finds  that  people  show  little 
awareness of the effects  of aggregate price level  changes on their lives 
and have  a tendency  to think in terms of quantities measured in local 
currencies  as standards of  value.28 Eldar Shafir,  Peter Diamond,  and 
Amos Tversky confirm empirically  that given calculations  presented in 
dollars,  people  tend to choose  stable dollar amounts,  and given  calcu- 
lations presented in real goods  and services,  they tend to choose  stable 
real amounts.29 That answers to questionnaire items are affected by the 
wording of the questions  and by associations  that the wording suggests 
is well  known to psychologists:  "framing"  affects  responses. 
Shafir, Diamond,  and Tversky also show that people  seem to have a 
preference for receiving  nominal pay increases,  even if they know that 
prices  have  gone  up just  as  much.  The  authors base  this  finding  on 
comparisons  of  choices  made  in scenario  questions  across  groups  of 
28.  Fisher  (1928). 
29.  Shafir, Diamond,  and Tversky  (1997). Robert  J. Shiller  175 
Table 2.  Characteristics  of Survey Respondents 
Percent, except as indicated 
Questionnaire 
Characteristic  USA-A  USA-B  Turkey 
Sex 
Male  75  75  80 
Female  25  25  20 
Birth year 
1970-79  5  3  21 
1960-69  16  11  35 
1950-59  23  21  21 
1940-49  26  23  18 
1930-39  12  15  3 
1920-29  12  17  ) 
1910-19  7  8  0 
Before  1910  1  1  0 
Educational attainment 
Less than high school graduate  4  7  9 
High school graduate  24  17  14 
Some college  25  24  17 
College  graduate  30  28  44 
Graduate or professional school  17  23  16 
Annual income 
Less than $25,000a  11  21  29 
$25,000 -$70  000b  67  55  47 
More than $70,000c  21  24  24 
Number of respondents  140  161  99 
Source: Author's survey. 
a. In Turkey, less than 600 million Turkish lira (TL). 
b. In Turkey, 600 million TL to 3 billion TL. 
c.  In Turkey, more than 3 billioi, TL. 
respondents.  I attempt, elsewhere,  to replicate their findings in a much 
less  subtle way,  by asking directly about this tendency,  and I compare 
the  answers  of  randomly  selected  people  with  those  of  professional 
economists  at major universities.30 I ask: 
Do you agree with the following statement?  "I think  that  if my pay went 
up I would feel more satisfaction  in my job, more sense of fulfillment, 
even if prices went up just as much." [Please indicate how much you 
agree, on a scale from 1 to 5.] 
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Response  in percent 
1. fully  2  3:  4  5: completely  Sample 
agree  undecided  disagree  size 
US-All  28  21  11  14  27  112 
Economists  0  8  3  13  77  79 
While  most  of  the  "US-All"  sample  of  noneconomists  did not fully 
agree with the statement,  about half of them chose  answers  1 or 2. It is 
striking  that so  many  would  agree,  since  this  question  is  essentially 
asking them to admit to irrational behavior.  Some of the noneconomists 
wrote remarks on the questionnaire,  saying  that they knew that it was 
irrational to choose  answers  1 or 2,  but they wanted to do so anyway. 
In  contrast,  most  of  the  economists  completely  disagreed  with  the 
statement. 
It is  difficult  to say to what extent  the anomalies  of judgment  that 
such money illusion  produces are responsible  for public apathy toward 
indexation.  If the dependence  of  answers  on framing  is the result of 
casual errors made by respondents who are only  marginally interested 
in answering correctly,  then it is perhaps unlikely  to be solely  respon- 
sible  for the widespread  apathy to indexation.  If there is  satisfaction 
in receiving  nominal  pay increases,  even  if prices  go  up as much,  it 
may  still  be  that when  people  think seriously  about major economic 
decisions,  they set aside such feelings.  Advocates  of indexed contracts 
make an effort to frame the discussion  in a way that encourages support, 
and presumably opinion  leaders who take more time to think about the 
issues  may  prevent  people  from  acting  wrongly  because  of  casual 
errors. 
It is my hypothesis  that more is at work in producing apathy toward 
indexation  than simple  money  illusion.  Money  illusion  just  does  not 
seem to be strong enough to prevent people from taking steps to protect 
their own  welfare  when  they really  understand the importance of  the 
issue.  In a sober and collected  moment, people ought to be able to make 
correct decisions  about indexation. To resolve the puzzle,  it is necessary 
to characterize further the worldview  that makes it difficult to convince 
people  of  the importance  of  indexation,  even  when  their attention  is 
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A Preliminary  Exercise  on Indexation 
A fundamental problem of designing  a questionnaire  for this study 
is that inflation and indexation are complicated  concepts,  which people 
may think that they understand but,  in fact,  do not.  As  a researcher, 
one  must decide  whether  one  is  interested  in people's  answers  from 
their current state of mind or in the answers that they give after one has 
forced them to confront what these terms mean, thereby educating them 
about the basic definitions  and issues.  And how does one know if they 
understand them? 
This  study is primarily interested  in the more informed judgments 
that people  make after some thought.  The questionnaires  begin with a 
brief description  of the issues  and then quiz respondents on the math- 
ematics  of indexation.  Making respondents work problems on indexa- 
tion forces  them to come  to grips with the issues  and also  allows  one 
to assess  whether they do understand the issues.  A disadvantage of this 
method  is  that it reduces  response  rates,  by  intimidating  many  who 
might otherwise  respond. 
All  three  versions  of  the  questionnaire  begin  with  the  following 
explanation: 
In this questionnaire  we seek your opinions on the subject of infation 
and indexation. 
By inflation, we mean the rate of increase in the cost of living (of the 
average price of goods and services you buy, of the Consumer  Price 
Index) as computed  from data  on actual  prices. 
By indexation,  we mean agreeing  now to tie the amounts  of money you 
will receive or pay at future dates to the inflation  rates the government 
announces in the future, so as to preserve real buying power. We say 
then that the payments are "indexed," or that there is an "Escalator 
Clause" or a "Cost of Living Allowance (COLA)." 
Example of Indexation: Mr. Smith [Ahmet Bey] who is retiring right 
now chooses a pension that is fully indexed to inflation.  He is promised 
$1,000 a month  in today's dollars  [20 million a month  in today's Turkish 
lira], indexed to inflation. If inflation turns out to be 5  percent [50 
percent]  over the next year, he will be getting $1,050 [30 million TL] a 
month  next year. If inflation  turns  out to be -5  percent [-50  percent] 
over the next year (prices are falling) he will be getting $950 [10 million 
TL] a month  next year. 
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1(A, B). If inflation  was 3 percent  [75 percent]  over the past year, then 
by definition  this means that: 
[Please circle one number] 
1. If we look at prices of many different  things, 3 percent  [75 percent] 
of them are too high. 
2.  Prices are on average 3 percent [75 percent] higher than they were 
last year 
3.  Wages are on average 3 percent [75 percent]  higher than they were 
last year 
4.  Prices are going up 3 percent  [75 percent]  more than  wages are 
5.  Do not know 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  3  84  1  12  1  138 
USA-B  1  79  0  17  3  159 
Turkey  6  72  5  15  1  97 
From the answers to this question,  it seems very clear that most people 
in both countries  understood  what inflation  is after reading the intro- 
duction.  The  tendency  of  some  to  select  answer 4 reveals  that some 
might,  in effect,  define inflation as a decrease  in real wages.  Still,  no 
more than one in six chose  this answer. 
Respondents  are then asked to work mathematical problems in order 
to test their understanding of indexation: 
2(A, B). Ms. Walter  [Ay?e Hanim]  is disabled, and is living off of fully 
indexed  disability  plan income. In 1996 she is receiving $500 [5 million 
TL] a month  in disability  payments.  If inflation  turns  out to be 10 percent 
[50 percent]  between 1996 and 1997, then in 1997 she will be receiving: 
1.  $450  [2.5  million  TL] 
2.  $500 [5 million TL] 
3.  $550  [7.5  million TL] 
4.  Do not know 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  size 
USA-A  4  2  94  1  139 
USA-B  3  1  94  3  160 
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3(A,  B): If inflation turns out to be  - 10  percent [ -  50 percent] (prices 
falling)  then in  1997 Ms.  Walter [Ay?e Hanim],  with her fully  indexed 
plan, will be receiving: 
1.  $450  [2.5  million  TL] 
2.  $500 [5 million TL] 
3.  $550  [7.5  million TL] 
4.  Do not know 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  size 
USA-A  94  2  4  1  140 
USA-B  85  7  2  6  161 
Turkey  76  17  4  3  99 
Respondents  did  remarkably  well  on  both  questions,  giving  correct 
answers  most of the time.  Some  Turkish respondents  seemed  to have 
a  little  difficulty  in  dealing  with  a  situation  in  which  prices  fall  by 
50 percent in a year and imagining  that payments might be cut in half 
in  nominal  terms,  but overall  the  responses  support the  notion  that 
people  understand indexation. 
The  following  question  is  intended  to  confirm that,  after working 
these problems,  respondents understand that indexation does  preserve 
real values: 
4(A,  B).  In the above question,  if all prices really fall  10 percent 
[50 percent] in 1997, what, in theory, ought to be the change between 
1996 and 1997 in the real buying  power  of Ms. Walter's  [Ay?e  Hanim's] 
indexed  disability  income? 
1.  In 1997 she can buy more goods  and services  than in 1996 
2.  She can buy exactly  the same amount in both years 
3.  In 1997 she can buy less goods and services than  in 1996 
4.  Do not know 
Response  in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  size 
USA-A  15  76  9  1  139 
USA-B  18  70  10  3  156 
Turkey  39  49  11  0  99 
Three-quarters of the United States respondents and half of the Turkish 
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who answered otherwise,  there was a definite bias toward the belief that 
the indexed contract provides more goods and services (answer 1). This 
could be a sign of a powerful tendency to think in nominal terms, even 
after working the mathematical problems correctly. There is, however, 
another possible  interpretation: people  do  not  believe  that the  price 
index  does  what it is said to do.  Moreover,  although the survey does 
not sample economists,  they would probably also show some tendency 
to pick answer 1, because of the substitution effect.  Both of these issues 
are discussed  below. 
The overall  interpretation of  the results presented above  is that re- 
spondents,  by and large,  had little  trouble with the basic  concepts  of 
indexation,  at least  after they  were explained  to them.  Most  of  them 
understood  that  indexation  preserves  real  buying  power  rather than 
nominal quantities.  This does not mean that people are always ready to 
give  such enlightened  answers.  Media accounts of indexation schemes 
rarely,  if ever,  give  as thorough an explanation  of the essential  quan- 
titative concepts regarding indexation as the questionnaires used in this 
study. 
Direct Questions 
When asked directly whether they would choose an indexed contract, 
most respondents  said that they would: 
5(A). Imagine that you are in Ms. Walter's [Ay?e Hanim's] situation. 
Experts' best guess is that there will be 3 percent [25 percent] a year 
inflation  indefinitely,  but  really they aren't  sure. Which  disability  income 
plan would you prefer? 
1. The indexed plan as with Ms. Walter [Ayse Hanim] (tied to future 
inflation  rates as computed  from data on actual  future  prices by govern- 
ment statisticians) 
2.  An unindexed  plan that increases  payments  3 percent [25 percent]  a 
year, regardless  of inflation 
3.  I am indifferent  between the two plans or don't know 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  size 
USA-A  65  29  7  136 
Turkey  85  9  6  86 Robert  J. Shiller  181 
The majority of respondents,  after having answered the preceding ques- 
tions,  chose  indexation.  The substantial minority that did not can pro- 
vide insights into public resistance to indexation.  It is important to note 
that those  in the USA-A  sample  who  chose  answer 2,  the unindexed 
plan, were almost as likely to answer question 4 correctly as the overall 
sample:  67  percent  of  those  who  chose  answer  2 for question  5 also 
chose  answer  2 to question  4  (of  the entire U.S.  sample,  73  percent 
chose  answer 2 for question 4). 
When the inflation rate built into the unindexed  plan was  changed 
from 3 to 10 percent and the unindexed plan was placed first in the list 
of answers,  more people still chose the indexed plan than the unindexed 
plan: 
5(B). Imagine  that  you are in Ms. Walter's  situation.  Experts'  best guess 
is that there will be 10 percent a year inflation indefinitely, but really 
they aren't sure. Which disability income plan would you prefer? 
1. An unindexed  plan that  increases  payments  10 percent  a year, regard- 
less of inflation 
2.  The indexed  plan as with Ms. Walter  (tied to future  inflation  rates as 
computed  from data on actual  future  prices by government  statisticians) 
3.  I am indifferent  between the two plans or don't know 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  size 
USA-B  44  47  9  153 
This  overall  show  of  support for indexation  seems  to stand in contra- 
diction  to the apparent lack of public  interest in indexation.  Possibly, 
the flow  of  the preceding  questions  made it clear that the  "correct" 
answer  was  the  indexed  plan,  and most  respondents  did not want to 
appear foolish.  Perhaps more interesting than the answers to question 
5 are the explanations  of these answers given in response to the follow- 
ing question: 
6(A,  B).  Can you explain why you made the choice that you did in 
question  5? 
On the one hand,  among respondents  who chose  the indexed  plan, 
the most  common  answer to question  6 was  some  restatement of  the 
basic message  of the early questions: indexed plans guarantee real buy- 
ing  power  and  are  safer.  On  the  other  hand,  there  were  103  U.S. 182  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
respondents,  but only  nine Turkish respondents,  who  picked  the un- 
indexed plan or said they were indifferent. 
Reading  the answers  given  by U.S.  respondents  who  chose  no in- 
dexation  in  question  5,  I conclude  that they  fall  into  several  major 
categories.  The most common explanation by USA-B  respondents who 
chose  the unindexed  plan was to refer to the  10 percent inflation fore- 
cast,  either expressing  doubt that inflation would be so high,  or saying 
that they expected to receive more under the unindexed plan: 42 percent 
of the USA-B  respondents  who chose  no indexation  appeared to offer 
the latter as a reason to prefer unindexed  contracts.  Only 7 percent of 
the USA-A  respondents who chose the unindexed plan seemed to expect 
to receive  more under that plan. These contrasting results do highlight 
a tendency  for  people  to  be  concerned  with  the  expected  return on 
assets,  as well as their risk-reduction benefits-and  it is rational to have 
such concerns.  The results show that one should not ask whether people 
want an indexed plan without specifying  its terms or expected  returns. 
People are attentive to these details and their answers will be influenced 
by the assumptions  that they make about these  details  if they  are left 
unspecified  in the question. 
The  most  common  explanation  given  by USA-A  respondents  who 
chose  the unindexed  plan (49 percent),  and the second  most common 
explanation  given by USA-B  respondents who did so (27 percent),  was 
that nominal  contracts  are inherently  desirable,  or indexation  is  too 
risky.  Their answers include: 
Bird in hand is worth  two in bush! 
It's a safer choice. 
I would rather  have a fixed increase, than  take a chance of a decrease  in 
inflation. 
I would rather  receive a definite  3 percent  increase  each year  than  gamble 
whether  or not the rates will increase  or decrease  each year. 
Yes the sure thing, better  than  a gamble. 
I would like to have a good idea of what I'll be getting, 10 percent  will 
always be 10 percent. But the indexed plan appears  to have many un- 
knowns and with that  comes fear and apprehension. 
Of these,  several respondents said that they did not like the possibility 
that they  might  see  their benefits  shrink if  inflation  were  lower  than 
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I would prefer  the unindexed  plan because even though  I would theoret- 
ically still be at the same standard  of living, I think  I would have trouble 
adjusting  to the idea of living on "less" money. 
You may at times be lower than what inflation actually is  [with the 
unindexed  plan], but it is never good to go backwards. 
The  next  most  common  explanation,  offered  by  17  percent  of  the 
USA-A  respondents and 5 percent of the USA-B  respondents who chose 
the unindexed  plan,  was doubt that the government  inflation numbers 
were valid for their individual  circumstances: 
I think some of the government  figures are wrong and buy [sic] smart 
shopping  you should be able to adjust. 
Aging brings  new cost-of-living expenses in goods and services (medical 
could be disastrous). 
If all things have equal choice I would be ok, but in my experience all 
goods and services would not go down in a free enterprise  situation. 
The government  knows no more about future inflation  than I. I picked 
[answer]  2 just to be safe. 
Of these,  several  respondents  thought that the government's  national 
inflation numbers could not be accurate in describing their geographical 
region: 
Figures  on inflation  are general  (nationwide)  while true inflation  hits the 
working  family where they live (regional). 
Index rates must be tied only to the actual location where the income is 
to be received,  i.e.,  KS inflation could be different than your CT 
inflation. 
There were also several respondents who raised the possibility  that the 
statisticians  who compute the government  inflation numbers are not to 
be trusted: 
Government  statistics  are manipulated. 
3 percent  a year is guaranteed!  Government  statisticians  are stupid and 
report  what there [sic] were told to report. 
A few respondents did not believe  that the indexed plan would pay out 
as promised: 
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Index  plan is a theory  and the way inflation  is going social security  could 
not handle  the index plan. 
And  a few  seemed  to associate  indexation  schemes  with  government 
interference: 
It would seem that  an unindexed  approach  leaves us with a little more  of 
a free market. 
The Turkish respondents who chose the indexed plan offered similar 
explanations  to those  of  the Americans  in question  6,  noting  that in- 
dexation preserves real buying power. However,  there was also a prom- 
inent  theme  of  disbelief  that inflation  in Turkey  would  be  as low  as 
25 percent a year. One respondent pointed out that a 1996 labor contract 
by  a well-known  firm specified  a 32.9  percent  wage  increase  for the 
first six months and another 34 percent for the subsequent six months. 
Fewer Turkish respondents  than Americans  chose  the unindexed  plan 
or were  uncertain,  and there are only  nine  corresponding  answers  to 
question  6.  These  appear to follow  the same general themes  as those 
from the United  States,  showing  a bias toward desiring  fixed nominal 
returns or questioning  the relevance  of the index to respondents'  own 
situations: 
I don't want to be tied to an uncertain  inflation  rate. 
Because the 25 percent  increasing  plan is more of a guarantee. 
In today's Turkey, I wouldn't sign any contract  indexed to something 
because there  are always different  and abnormal  increases. 
A couple  of these respondents  appeared to expect  that inflation would 
be less  than 25 percent a year in Turkey: 
The experts are not certain. Because of this, instead  of increasing,  infla- 
tion will decrease. Then, it will not be of any use to me. 
I believe it will be more profitable. 
Four respondents  mentioned  lack of trust in the government: 
Inflation  rates  prepared  by the DIE [government  department  of statistics] 
are from time to time adjusted  according  to government  politics. I mean 
it doesn't seem believable to me. Because of this, I'd choose [answer]  2 
instead  of the indexed plan. 
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I don't trust  my country. 
Nothing will happen  in this country. 
Some  of  the Turkish respondents  who  chose  the indexed  plan also 
mentioned concerns that the government cannot be trusted. The appar- 
ently  higher proportion of  Turkish respondents  than Americans  who 
lack trust in their government  is  not surprising.  Widespread  concern 
about government corruption in Turkey led to an unusually strong show- 
ing by the Islamic  Welfare  party (Refah)  in the December  1995 elec- 
tions.  In July  1996,  just  before  the questionnaire  surveys  were  con- 
ducted, Welfare party leader Necmettin Erbakan became prime minister 
in a coalition government. This is the country's first Islamic government 
since Mustafa Kemal Atatuirk  created a modern, secular Turkey in 1923. 
Political  observers  interpret the change,  in part, as reflecting  a broad 
public perception of corruption or incompetence  in the government and 
the hope  that a new  government  might be different.  It is perhaps not 
clear that concern about government corruption or incompetence  would 
lead one to choose  an unindexed  contract; on the contrary, corrupt or 
incompetent  officials  might be more likely  to inflate the currency than 
to doctor inflation  numbers.  In any case,  this concern  apparently has 
not biased the results of question  5 very far against indexation. 
Some  economists  argue that people  may prefer fixed nominal  con- 
tracts because  they have preexisting  fixed nominal contracts.  The po- 
tential  significance  of this argument is not as great as one might think 
at first because,  as a result of the failure to index,  most people  avoid 
strict long-term  nominal contracts; pension  plans are the major excep- 
tion.  A long-term  fixed rate home  mortgage is  another plausible  can- 
didate as a large nominal liability in the U.S.  context.  However,  people 
can and do refinance their mortgages if inflation-and  interest rates- 
declines.  People paying or receiving  fixed long-term alimony payments 
might worry about the price level  changing,  but in such an event their 
troubles would be limited,  since they have the option of modifying  their 
alimony contracts in court. Disabled  people like Ms. Walter or retirees 
on defined benefit plans are rarely locked  into any long-term  nominal 
debt,  so it is hard to find any evidence  of long-term nominal contracts 
that could  cause  them not to want their pension  or disability  benefits 
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make any mention of indexation  being problematic  as a result of pre- 
existing  nominal contracts. 
Math Anxiety 
Apparently, one reason why people do not respond well to indexation 
proposals  is that these  describe  payments  as determined by a mathe- 
matical formula. From the interviews  in this survey,  it seems that such 
formulas apparently touch deep anxieties  or uncertainties in many peo- 
ple. Even though most questionnaire respondents chose indexation after 
working some indexation problems,  it seems likely that some degree of 
math anxiety  is inhibiting a strong public movement  in favor of index- 
ation.  It is probably because  of  these  anxieties  that most news  media 
avoid  mathematics  entirely:  a newspaper  writer will  never  include  a 
mathematical  formula  in  a  story,  even  though  it  might  enlighten  a 
substantial number of readers. 
If people  feel  that it is very difficult to understand indexation,  they 
will be reticent to introduce it into contracts of any complexity,  fearing 
it to be a distraction  or obstacle  that will  prevent full  appreciation of 
the  benefits  of  the  contract.  Moreover,  if  people  are never  made  to 
understand some of the basic quantitative concepts  of indexation fully, 
they will have difficulty  in judging  whether a specific  indexed contract 
serves their interests.  For example,  an ill-informed  person might easily 
misinterpret the difference  between the stated yield on a nominal bond 
and the stated yield  on an indexed  bond as an "insurance  premium" 
against inflation-induced fluctuations in income,  rather  than understand- 
ing it simply  as an expected  inflation rate.3  This confusion  will  make 
indexed  bonds appear much less  attractive. 
To see why people  would arrive at the conclusion  that indexation  is 
hard to understand, think of the kinds of news stories that they regularly 
encounter.  Some  present  the  level  of  the  Consumer  Price  Index,  a 
number like 253.2.  Many people  must feel that they do not know what 
31.  Some popular accounts of indexed bonds seem to encourage just such confusion. 
For example,  syndicated  columnist  Stephen Higgins  writes:  "The  obvious  point is that 
these  bonds  will  pay  a slightly  lower  interest rate than conventional  Treasury bonds. 
Analysts estimate the total return will be 3 to 4 percent a year. But conservative  investors 
interested in protecting principal won't  necessarily  consider that an obstacle."  ("A  Few 
Things  You  Should  Know  about Inflation Indexed  Bonds,"  New Haven  Register,  De- 
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this  number means.  Occasionally  there are stories  about the various 
price  indexes,  perhaps discussing  the rebasing  of  indexes  or alleged 
biases  in them. It is easy to see how people might throw up their hands 
and start to think that it is asking too much to expect them to understand 
what it is all about. 
The survey asks directly about math anxiety in the context of index- 
ation: 
7(A). Do you agree with the following statement?  "I am not sure that I 
fully understand  all the mathematics  of indexation;  if I had to sign a 
contract  that had an indexation  clause in it, I would feel the need to talk 
to someone more knowledgeable about indexation." [Please indicate 
how much you agree, on a scale from 1 to 5.] 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  30  36  7  17  11  137 
Turkey  25  49  4  10  12  92 
7(B). "I feel confident  that I understand  the mathematics  of indexation 
well; if I had to sign a contract  that had an indexation  clause in it, I 
wouldn't feel the need to talk to someone more knowledgeable  about 
indexation.  " 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  32  36  8  14  9  153 
The results are not very enlightening.  In questionnaire A and in the 
Turkish questionnaire,  which suggest that there might be math anxiety, 
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in questionnaire  B,  where the question  is reworded to suggest  that the 
respondent  might feel  confident  about such calculations,  the answers 
were reversed.  It should  be noted that these  responses  were given  by 
people who had just answered the math problems,  and not by the people 
who threw the questionnaires  away. 
It seems  likely,  despite  the lack of  solid  evidence  here,  that math 
anxiety  is an issue.  Various hints of  an aversion to mathematical for- 
mulae and preference  for nominal quantities  seemed  to come  through 
in the informal  interviews  but are difficult  to incorporate into a ques- 
tionnaire.  It seemed  that,  in  contrast  with  an  abstract mathematical 
indexation formula, the nominal quantities in unindexed contracts have 
more tangible  value.  Perhaps people  associate  nominal  contract pay- 
ments with stronger mental images of coins and notes-attractive,  dig- 
nified,  finely  detailed  art objects  that have  acquired deep,  symbolic, 
cultural value.  People  seem  to attach importance to having  cash.  Re- 
spondents noted,  for example,  that people all around the world want to 
hold  dollars,  or that there is  a common  consensus  about the value  of 
the dollar.  Some seemed to be saying that the dollar never loses  value, 
but the economy  changes  around it.  By contrast,  to put one's  faith in 
an index  number apparently requires trusting some  mathematics  that 
only  a few,  remote  people  understand.  Still,  these  nuances tended to 
be fleeting  and may disappear under further questioning,  so it is hard 
to know how important they might be in explaining  why indexation  is 
not more widespread. 
Doubts  about the Accuracy  of the Consumer Price Index 
Another reason why enthusiasm for indexation is not stronger is that 
many people  do  not trust the price  indexes.  In the interviews,  some 
people  expressed  mistrust  in these  numbers,  but their remarks were 
often flippant and hard to interpret. One possibility,  suggested by some 
of the interviewees  as well as the answers to question 6 discussed above, 
is that people  think that the numbers might be fraudulent: 
8(A). "An important  reason  not to trust  contracts  indexed to inflation  is 
that someone in the government  might deliberately  falsify the inflation 
numbers  to take advantage  of people like me." 
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3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  21  24  16  27  13  139 
Turkey  18  43  4  21  13  91 
8(B). "An important  reason  to trust  contracts  indexed  to inflation  is that 
those people in the government  who are responsible for the inflation 
numbers  are basically honest and trustworthy." 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  6  29  20  28  18  158 
The results give  some  suggestion  that fraud might be important, espe- 
cially  in Turkey, where 64 percent agreed at least somewhat.  The U.S. 
answers  are not strongly biased  toward this opinion,  but perhaps it is 
significant that people  are not more uniformly confident in government 
statistics. 
It is also possible  that people  are skeptical  about the inherent value 
of the numbers, whether or not those who produce them are deliberately 
fraudulent: 
9(A). "The government  inflation  numbers  are almost useless in describ- 
ing my cost of living increases;  the national  inflation  rate  says little about 
inflation  in the things  that  I tend to buy in the places where  I buy them." 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
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Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  24  32  18  18  8  140 
Turkey  18  36  8  23  15  92 
9(B).  "I believe that the government  inflation  numbers  are pretty  accu- 
rate in describing  my cost of living increases;  the national  inflation  rate 
accurately  describes the inflation  in the things that I tend to buy in the 
places where I buy them." 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  5  41  12  31  12  157 
There was not a lot of agreement to question 9,  and when the wording 
was reversed in questionnaire B, faith in the numbers improved. Indeed, 
in talking to people about the accuracy of inflation numbers, it appeared 
that many had a resigned faith,  a sense that all prices inevitably  march 
with these numbers. 
And yet,  despite  these  answers,  there does  seem  to be widespread 
mistrust of some  sort. The survey pursues the theory that the inflation 
numbers may be trustworthy now,  but that they would become untrust- 
worthy if inflation became  very high: 
10(A). "When inflation  gets very high, prices of individual  items jump 
around  a lot more  relative  to each other, and  so the inflation  rate  becomes 
a much worse measure  of the increase  in the cost of living." 
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Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  18  36  29  14  4  139 
Turkey  23  51  4  15  8  93 
1O(B). "When inflation  gets very high, prices of individual  items tend 
to fall in line with the inflation  rate, all marching  up at the same rate, 
and so the inflation  rate becomes a much better  measure  of the increase 
in the cost of living." 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  11  25  11  37  16  157 
The responses  to both versions  of question  10 are mildly  supportive of 
the notion that people feel that the accuracy of inflation numbers would 
be questionable  if inflation were high. 
Overall,  the evidence  suggests  some tendency  to mistrust the infla- 
tion numbers, which may be a factor in public resistance to indexation, 
even  if it is not important enough to explain the resistance  by itself.  If 
mistrust  of  published  index  numbers were  the only  obstacle,  people 
could  define their own  indexes  for the purposes of their contracts,  as 
the State of Massachusetts  did in the very first indexed bond issue,  in 
1780.32 
Perceptions  of Substitution Bias 
Some  of  the respondents  in the informal  interviews  suggested  that 
they avoided most of the effects  of inflation by "smart shopping";  that 
32.  The  Massachusetts  indexed  bond issue  of  1780  defined  its own  price  index  in 
terms of four commodities  (see  note 8).  In modern times one could,  for example,  index 
long-term contract payments to an average of prices that regularly appear in newspaper 
advertisements.  Thus the index would be given  a formal definition without any reliance 
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is, by switching from high-priced  full-service stores to discount stores 
and by avoiding those items that show the greatest  increases in prices. 
If cream  cheese becomes expensive, they might switch to peanut  butter 
and not suffer much from the price change. Such reasoning calls to 
mind  the well-known substitution  bias in Laspeyres  price indexes, such 
as the U.S.  Consumer  Price Index. 
Laspeyres price indexes are biased toward overestimating  the in- 
crease in the cost of obtaining  a fixed level of utility, so long as relative 
prices change during  the process of inflation. The reason for this bias 
is that when relative prices change, people can substitute  the items that 
become relatively  less expensive for those that  become more  expensive. 
A contract  that promises that a person will receive a fixed amount in 
real  dollars  as measured  by the Consumer  Price  Index  allows that  person 
to consume the same market  basket as before. Thus the person can be 
no worse off,  and in fact will generally be better off,  since relative 
price changes create opportunities  for substitution. 
Economists  have concluded, however, that  in recent  U.S. experience 
the substitution  bias has not amounted  to much. The U.S.  Senate Ad- 
visory Commission to Study the Consumer  Price Index concludes that 
the commodity  substitution  bias is only 0.4 percent  a year  and  the outlet 
substitution  bias is only 0.1 percent  a year, for a total  bias of 0.5 percent 
a year.33  Jack Triplett  concludes that the substitution  bias in the U.S. 
CPI is no greater  than  0. 1 percent  per year. Steven Braithwait  estimates 
this substitution  bias at 0. 1 percent  per year, and Marilyn  Manser  and 
Richard  McDonald give a range from 0. 14 to 0.22 percent per year. 
Alastair  Cunningham's  rather  lower estimate for the U.K. Retail Price 
Index, 0.05  percent per year, presumably  results from the yearly re- 
weighting of this Laspeyres  price index.34  Ultimately, the estimates of 
substitution  bias are low because people do not, in fact, tend to shift 
much of their consumption away from items whose prices have in- 
creased more, and also because the variation  in relative prices is not 
very large. 
Assuming  that  people understand  the substitution  bias at some level, 
is it possible that they overestimate  the extent of the bias? 
33.  U.S. Senate, Committee  on Finance  (1996). 
34.  Triplett  (1975); Braithwait  (1980); Manser  and McDonald  (1988); Cunningham 
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11(A). "Even when there is 3 or 4 percent  [80 to 100 percent]  inflation, 
there are still some prices that go down, or don't go up so much, and 
someone with fixed income might  escape any real effects of inflation  just 
by smart  shopping, switching  to those items that  go up less." 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  9  44  5  26  15  138 
Turkey  4  17  4  25  49  95 
11(B). "When there is 3 or 4 percent  inflation,  there is no escaping that 
one needs to have about  3 or 4 percent  more  income to live as well; there 
is no way that "smart shopping," trying to switch purchases  towards 
items whose prices are going up less or going down, is going to save you 
from the ravages  of inflation." 
1.  Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  23  34  8  28  6  158 
12(A, B). If inflation  is 10 percent  [100 percent]  a year, how much  more 
income does a smart  shopper  who is a little flexible about  what  he or she 
buys need to be just as well off? Please give a number,  even if it is only 
a guess. 
Sample 
Median (percent)  size 
USA-A  10  136 
Turkey  100  85 
USA-B  10  154 
These answers offer no support for the impression that people think that 
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Lack of Appreciation  of Concavity of Utility Function 
Understanding  the  welfare  benefits  of  indexation  is  dependent  on 
knowing  the concavity  of the utility function  over the relevant range. 
The benefits  from indexing  to actual inflation,  as opposed  to grading 
payments in accordance with expected  inflation,  are entirely related to 
risk management,  and hence  to the concavity  of  utilities.  One might 
ask  whether  this  concavity  is  prominent  in people's  minds.  Perhaps 
their appreciation of the concavity  of their utility  functions  is not au- 
tomatic; perhaps the concavity  must be fairly extreme or vividly  illus- 
trated before they are aware of it. They may be accustomed to assessing 
risk in terms of  linear utility  unless  the importance of concave  utility 
functions  is firmly impressed on them. 
It is not easy to elicit  whether people think about this concavity,  but 
the survey tries a couple of questions.  If people reliably make judgments 
in terms of utility theory,  they should be able to recognize  that theory 
when it is stated: 
13(A). Which of the following two statements  sounds better  to you: 
1.  "Sure I might  lose out on an unindexed  plan if inflation  is higher  than 
expected, but offsetting this, I might win big if inflation  is lower than 
expected. In my mind, it  all averages out,  so  I don't care if  I  am 
indexed.  " 
2.  "With an unindexed  plan, the possibility that  I will be a lot poorer  if 
inflation  is higher than expected weighs more heavily in my mind than 
the possibility that I will be a lot richer  if inflation  is less than  expected. 
Being poorer  hurts  more  than  being richer  feels good, and  thus  indexation 
makes me feel better  off on balance. 
3.  Neither  or no opinion 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  size 
USA-A  13  56  32  136 
Turkey  18  68  13  92 
13(B). "Sure I might lose out on an unindexed  plan if inflation  is higher 
than expected, but offsetting this, I might win big if inflation  is lower 
than  expected. In my mind, as long as indexed  plans aren't  biased  to pay 
out more or less, I don't care if I am indexed." 
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3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
1  2  3  4  5  Sample  size 
USA-B  6  21  32  21  19  155 
It must be  admitted that respondents  did pretty well  in choosing  the 
economist's  answer to question  13(A); they do seem aware of the im- 
plications  of concave  utility functions.35 
Prejudice  against  Indexed Instruments 
Any presumed benefits from indexation that are due to risk reduction 
might, be offset  if people  think that expected  returns are lower  on in- 
dexed  than unindexed  contracts.  When presented with the possibility 
of purchasing U.S.  government  indexed  bonds,  respondents to the in- 
formal interviews often expressed prejudice against them, asserting that 
such bonds could not be expected  to perform well  as investments.  This 
leads  one  to wonder  if there might really  be public  prejudice against 
indexed bonds,  per se.  Hence the survey asks following  question: 
13'(B). How much  more money would you expect indexed  bonds to pay 
bond holders, on average, in the long run, when compared  to conven- 
tional (unindexed)  bonds? (This is a question about expected long-run 
historical average returns,  averaging  over many different  historical pe- 
riods and investor  experiences, not a question  about  what will happen  to 
any one investor.) 
1. Indexed  bonds will pay much more on average 
2.  Indexed  bonds will pay somewhat  more on average 
3.  Indexed  bonds will pay about  the same on average 
4.  Indexed  bonds will pay somewhat  less on average 
5.  Indexed  bonds will pay much less on average 
6.  Do not know 
35.  A translation error in question  13(A) on the Turkish questionnaire  was brought 
to my attention  after the questionnaire  was  distributed: the word  "richer"  in the first 
sentence  of answer 2 was rendered as "poorer."  The second  sentence  of answer 2 was 
translated correctly.  Perhaps respondents  realized  that the mistranslated sentence  made 
no sense and responded instead to the intended meaning; at least,  the similarity between 
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Response in percent 
1  2  3  4  5  6  Sample  size 
USA-B  9  33  20  10  1  26  156 
Surprisingly,  there was,  if anything,  a prejudice in the other direction: 
more people  seemed  to  think that the  indexed  bonds  would  pay  out 
more.  This  result  does  not  support the  hypothesis  that  a  prejudice 
against indexed bonds is a factor diminishing  public support for index- 
ation.  Possibly,  the prejudices  voiced  in the personal  interviews  are 
nothing more than typical investor prejudices about government bonds, 
rather than attitudes to indexation.  It may still be the case that on seeing 
the lower initial yields  that indexed bonds tend to offer,  people  start to 
think that they will  do less  well  than unindexed bonds over time. 
Lack of Uncertainty about Future Inflation 
For any given concavity  of the utility function,  indexation is impor- 
tant as a risk management  device  only  if  people  feel  that inflation  is 
fairly uncertain. However,  there seems to be some lack of appreciation 
of the potential for unforecastable  price level  movements.  It is hard to 
characterize the nature of people's  uncertainty about future prices,  but 
the survey tries a couple  of questions  to this end: 
14(A). We want to know how accurately  you think  that  financial  experts 
in America [Turkey]  can predict  the price level in 2006, ten years from 
now. Can you tell us, if these experts think that a "market  basket" of 
goods and services that the typical person buys will cost $1,000  [100 
million TL] in 2006, then you think that it will probably  actually cost: 
between  $ -  [TL] and $ -  [TL]. 
Median  ratio  Sample 
(highllow)  size 
USA-A  4/3  121 
Turkey  3/2  76 
14(B). How accurately  do you think that financial  experts in America 
can predict the price level in 2006, ten years from now? By the price 
level, we mean  the price of all items that  people buy, the Consumer  Price 
Index. (This may be a tough question, but we want to gauge how well 
you think  that  we really can predict  future  inflation,  so please try to give 
an answer.) 
Experts will  probably be accurate within a range of plus or minus 
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Sample 
Median  size 
USA-B  10  148 
Respondents  report extremely  low  levels  of  uncertainty.  The Turkish 
sample's  median ratio of  1.5 between high and low estimates,  suggest- 
ing a 50 percent confidence  interval of plus or minus 20 percent, seems 
especially  low.  To get some sense of the potential for uncertainty about 
the price level  in Turkey,  note that the Turkish CPI increased two and 
a half-fold  between  1964 and 1974, thirty-fold between  1974 and 1984, 
and  119-fold  between  1984  and  1994.  If one  takes  these  decades  as 
plausible scenarios for the next decade, one might rather suggest a high- 
to-low  ratio of something  like  119/2.5,  or nearly 50. 
The uncertainty that Americans report is fairly consistent  across the 
two  ways  of  asking the question.  This uncertainty is low  enough  that 
one  might well  question  whether indexation  is a good  idea.  Suppose, 
for example,  that people  have log utility and think that without index- 
ation they have an equal chance  of getting  an income  of one unit and 
an income of 4/3 units in ten years. By standard expected utility theory, 
eliminating  this risk (replacing  the uncertain income  in ten years with 
a certain  income  of  7/6  units)  is  worth only  about  1 percent of  their 
income  in ten years,  or of the order of  10 basis points per year for ten- 
year investments.  Thus in deciding whether to invest in indexed bonds, 
the  question  whether  these  will  pay  more  or less,  on  average,  than 
unindexed  instruments will  swamp the issue  of risk management.  Es- 
sentially the same conclusion  follows  from the Turkish responses.  With 
log  utility,  people  would  pay only  about 2  percent of  income  in ten 
years to replace an equal chance of getting  an income  of  1.5 units and 
an income  of  1 unit with a sure income  of  1.25 units. 
Perceived  Relevance  of Inflation Innovations 
The  variability  in the CPI numbers does  not necessarily  represent 
uncertainty to individuals.  The interview responses  suggest that people 
sometimes  feel  that they  already know  the future path of that part of 
the CPI that is relevant to their own experience  and that only the mea- 
surement error in the CPI is unforecastable.  It is hard to write a question 
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15(B). "People don't know today what the increase  in their  own cost of 
living will be next year and for understanding  their own cost of living 
they would learn a lot from next year's inflation  numbers  if they could 
get them today." 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  24  50  14  9  3  156 
Respondents  tended to agree with this statement,  suggesting  that infor- 
mation revealed  by the Consumer Price Index is generally  trusted and 
contradicting  the hypothesis  that people  do  not think that CPI infor- 
mation is relevant to themselves. 
Perception  That Inflation Harms Working People  and Firms 
In another paper on public perceptions  of  inflation,  I conclude  that 
most people think that the real income of working people  is harmed by 
inflation.36 Wages are perceived  as responding only sluggishly  to infla- 
tion.  This is confirmed by the present survey: 
16(A, B). If the government  were to become irresponsible  with money 
management  and allow the inflation  rate to go up so much that prices 
double [go up ten-fold] (increase  by 100 percent  [1,000 percent])  in the 
next five years, how much do you think that the income (measured  in 
dollars) of the typical wage earner  would go up in the same interval  of 
time? [Note that if income goes up by 100 percent  [1  ,000 percent], then 
in terms of real buying power the wage earner  would be unaffected  by 
the inflation, since income goes up just as much as prices.] 
1. 200 percent [2,000 percent] or more (great increase in real buying 
power) 
2.  150 to 199 percent  [1,500 to 1,999 percent] 
3.  120 percent  to 149 percent  [1,200 to 1,499 percent] 
4.  80 percent  to 1  19 percent [800 to 1,199 percent]  (real buying power 
is about  the same) 
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5.  50 to 79 percent  [500 to 799 percent] 
6.  0 percent  to 49 percent  [O  to 499 percent] 
7.  Less than  0 percent  (income in dollars  would go down) 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  size 
USA-A  2  1  3  29  36  26  3  131 
USA-B  3  1  1  15  29  42  9  150 
Turkey  1  5  5  22  45  12  11  85 
These answers reveal that people have a striking tendency to doubt that 
incomes  will  keep up with inflation.  This seems  to explain  a lot about 
the failure to index.  Such  a view  appears also  to explain  why  people 
do not index alimony  payments.  If the father's income is not expected 
to keep up with inflation,  then he cannot be expected  to be able to pay 
the increased  alimony.  The answers to question  16 do not so directly 
explain  why  people  do not show  more interest in buying  government 
bonds,  since  in  this  scenario  they  are on  the  receiving  side  of  the 
equation. 
If people  think that inflation hurts working people,  then one  might 
expect  them to think that it helps companies.  The survey asks: 
16'(B). "If there  is really  a lot of inflation,  then  companies  that  promised 
complete wage indexation  (full cost of living allowances) to their em- 
ployees will probably be in trouble: the companies will have trouble 
paying  all the increased  wages out of the money  the company  is making." 
1. Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  29  43  7  15  6  86 
Surprisingly,  the weight  of  the evidence  shows  that people  think that 
inflation hurts companies  too.  If this is a valid  interpretation, part of 
the reason that one does not see more COLA clauses  in labor contracts 
might be  that people  think that these  are too  big  a concession  from 
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This line of thought is perhaps not so surprising, given the tendency 
of people to think that inflation hurts everybody.37 In fact, many people 
seem  to have trouble with the economist's  notion that inflation redis- 
tributes wealth among people: 
17(A, B). Who gets hurt  more by unexpectedly  high inflation? 
1. Creditors  (those who lent money) 
2.  Debtors  (those who borrowed  money) 
3.  Don't know 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  size 
USA-A  44  48  8  133 
USA-B  44  48  9  151 
Turkey  76  21  2  85 
American respondents seemed very unsure about the answer to question 
17; responses  were  almost  equally  divided  between  answers  1 and 2. 
When  those  who  chose  answer  2  were  asked  in interview  to explain 
why they did so,  some replied,  essentially,  that under a high inflation 
regime  debtors  would  suffer  a decline  in real  income,  which  would 
make it difficult  for them to pay their debts.  Creditors, people  seem to 
think, are rich bankers, who have the means to ensure that they do not 
suffer from inflation.38 The terms "debtor"  and "creditor"  are appar- 
ently interpreted by many respondents as "poor and middle class"  and 
"rich,"  respectively.  Indeed,  respondents tend mainly to use the dis- 
tinction between  the poor and middle class  and the rich and rarely talk 
in terms of debtors and creditors.  In light of this,  the survey asks: 
18(B). Who gets hurt  most by unexpectedly  high inflation? 
1. Poor people 
2.  The middle class 
3.  Rich people 
4.  Don't know 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  size 
USA-B  46  47  3  4  153 
37.  See  also Shiller  (1997). 
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These results show strong expectations  that the rich will not suffer from 
inflation. 
High Inflation Scenarios 
When  discussing  the  possibility  of  high  inflation,  interviewees 
tended to describe such a scenario as involving  a great deal of economic 
chaos and social unrest. This tendency is manifest in the answers to the 
following  question,  whose wording was taken, in part, from the mouths 
of some of the interviewees:39 
19(A). "If there is high inflation  (over 10 percent  [200 percent]  a year) 
in the future, it is likely that  the inflation  will spark  economic and social 
chaos (events such as widespread  corporate  bankruptcies,  riots in the 
streets, hunger)." 
1.  Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  12  42  12  22  12  137 
Turkey  49  37  7  4  2  89 
Respondents  show quite strong agreement with question  19. The effect 
of  this belief  is probably to reduce support for indexation:  if extreme 
inflation results in such chaos,  it is possible  that something unforeseen 
will  invalidate  an indexed  contract.  That indexed  contracts might be 
frustrated in such times is investigated  below. 
Expectations  of Government Intervention 
Some  of  the  skepticism  about  indexed  contracts  expressed  in  the 
interviews  seemed  to  involve  doubts  about likely  future government 
actions.  Although  interviewees  were not often  articulate about this,  it 
appears that people  might  believe  that the government  will  often,  to 
39.  This tendency is also documented  in the tabulation  of answers to open-ended 
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some extent,  frustrate the purpose of long-term contracts in attempting 
to equalize  incomes  after the fact. 
It is well  known  that the government  does  frustrate some  people's 
efforts to protect their real incomes,  for example,  through the progres- 
sive tax system  and means testing for many government programs and 
services.  Moreover,  there is one historical example of the U.S.  govern- 
ment effectively  repudiating an analogue of indexed government debt: 
government  bonds  that promised  payment  in  gold.  This  occurred  in 
1933,  when the government annulled the gold clause  after the price of 
gold  had increased.40 Very  highly  inflationary periods  are often  also 
periods  of  national crisis,  and sociologists  have noted that calamities 
tend to cause  "sharp reallocation  of wealth"  and to release  "powerful 
forces tending to rectify economic  inequalities."4'  Possibly people feel 
that such potential government actions weaken the case for indexation. 
The survey asks: 
20(A). "If there is a lot of inflation  in the future, then the government 
won't really allow those people who bought  long-term  indexed  bonds to 
get any real benefit  from the indexation.  All the other  people who didn't 
buy the bonds  can vote, and  they won't tolerate  the indexed  bond  holders 
making extra money while everyone else is suffering. Under pressure 
from voters, the government  will figure  out some tax rule or the like to 
take the gains from indexation  away from indexed  bond holders." 
1.  Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  11  37  20  21  10  137 
Turkey  8  47  13  23  9  90 
This leading question  is turned into an affirmative statement for ques- 
tionnaire B: 
20(B). "If there is a lot of inflation  in the future, then I trust that the 
U.S.  government  will really allow those people who bought long-term 
40.  See Cassel  (1936)  and Hawtrey (1939). 
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indexed bonds to get full benefit from the indexation. The government 
would make sure that no tax law change or other government  provision 
would ever compromise  the real purpose  of indexation." 
1.  Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  8  25  14  31  21  154 
These  results  support the notion  that people  think it somewhat  likely 
that the government will frustrate the purpose of indexation.  Most peo- 
ple agree,  at least somewhat,  with question 20(A).  In the questionnaire 
B version,  most  people  disagree  that the government  can be trusted. 
Note  that despite  indications  that Turkish people  are very  concerned 
about corruption in their government,  their answers are virtually iden- 
tical to those  of the Americans.  Perhaps question  20 is not seen to be 
about corruption but about powerful political or moral forces in society. 
Collective  Response  Patterns 
Individuals  sometimes  seem  to  lack  interest  in taking  actions  that 
might put them ahead of society  as a whole,  especially  if these appear 
not to conform to customary standards or universally  approved behav- 
ior. There is a sense  of  social  cohesion  in economic  vicissitudes;  that 
is,  there appears to be a sense  of sharing with others,  sometimes  even 
resentment of those who think they have outsmarted the others.  Soci- 
ologists  have  noted,  moreover,  a  strong  tendency  for  collective  re- 
sponse  to disaster,  and it has been  shown  above  that the prospect  of 
very high inflation appears to be widely perceived as a potential national 
disaster.42 
That collective  feelings  affect market decisions  is confirmed by sur- 
vey  work conducted  by Maxim  Boycko,  Vladimir  Korobov,  and I in 
various countries.43 In the context of such social  cohesion,  people will 
42.  On collective  response  to disaster,  see Baker and Chapman (1962). 
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make  economic  choices  that are commonly  recognized  as  wise  and 
customary, but they may not have an emotional commitment to studying 
and acting  on unusual economic  proposals  that would  set them apart 
from others. By contrast, an education in economics  or business studies 
seems rather to encourage an attitude of self-congratulation  about hav- 
ing made more sensible  economic  decisions  than most people. 
It is  difficult  to  study  such  feelings  of  social  cohesion  among  the 
general  public  in a paper of  this scope.  I make a weak effort  to pro- 
vide  some  evidence  that noneconomists  have such feelings  as regards 
inflation: 
21(A). "Somehow, the fact that inflation  affects nearly  everyone makes 
the threat  of problems  created by inflation  seem of less concern to me 
personally; maybe it's shared feeling for other Americans, maybe it's 
the idea that if we are all in the same boat together  none of us feels so 
bad about  lowered  buying  power because  of inflation.  Thus I am  just not 
that  interested  in being one of the few who are  protected  from the effects 
of inflation." 
1.  Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree 
Response in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-A  2  12  18  28  40  137 
Turkey  8  26  15  11  40  89 
Respondents  tend to disagree  with this statement,  contrary to my ex- 
pectations.  The question is reversed for questionnaire B, suggesting  the 
opposite  answer: 
21(B). "Somehow, the fact that inflation  affects nearly  everyone makes 
the threat  of problems  created  by inflation  seem of more concern to me 
personally.  If we are all in the same boat together,  it hurts  much  more." 
1.  Strongly  agree 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neutral  or no opinion 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Strongly  disagree Robert  J. Shiller  205 
Response  in percent 
Sample 
1  2  3  4  5  size 
USA-B  12  3  1  24  23  9  154 
Respondents  did not tend to disagree  with this statement,  again,  con- 
trary to my expectations.  These  results of  questions  21(A)  and 21(B) 
are not really  supportive of the notion that people  are relatively  unin- 
terested in taking measures that would set them apart from their friends 
and neighbors  in times  of  national stress.  This  issue  could  be studied 
with  much more care.  It is likely  that further work would  reveal  that 
although  such collective  feelings  do not provide  a stand-alone  expla- 
nation of public resistance  to indexation,  they do help to explain  why 
there tends not to be action on indexation. 
Conclusion 
Economists  have been perplexed for a very long time by the public's 
continuing  reliance  on  long-term  nominal  contracts  in  the  face  of  a 
potential for massive  inflation.  In the 1830s Scrope wrote: "And  what 
a farce it surely  is to talk of property being  effectively  protected in a 
country in which an unseen and secret cause  may,  within a few years, 
transfer property to the amount of 1,500 millions  from one set of people 
to  another,  contrary to  the  intentions  and understanding  of  the  par- 
ties?"44 Well  over  a century  and a half  have  gone  by,  and the  farce 
continues.  Is there any hope that the public will  one day see the error 
of their ways  and start routinely  indexing  long-term contracts? 
This  survey  finds that the idea of  indexation  is indeed not hard for 
many people  to understand. Most  respondents  were able to articulate 
the theory of indexation,  if asked to do so; most even seemed to embrace 
the idea of  indexation,  after having  demonstrated their understanding 
of it. Yet their tendency to accept indexation on the questionnaires only 
heightens  the puzzle,  since  the general public shows  so little  interest. 
The survey response mirrors the understanding of indexation that Irving 
Fisher seemingly  successfully  conveyed  in business  forums in the first 
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part of this century, and highlights  the frustration that he must have felt 
when he tried to get action on his proposals for indexation. 
I argue that the explanation for the lack of enthusiasm for indexation 
cannot  be  monocausal.  People  have  a lot  of  thoughts  about inflation 
that together  conspire  to produce the belief  that indexation  plans  are 
not a very good idea. Economists  will continue to be puzzled until they 
try to  appreciate the collective  impact of  several  different  aspects  of 
people's  world views. 
Money illusion  does,  to some extent,  seem to be an important factor 
in the puzzle.  Many people do say,  "I want to know how much money 
I will  be getting."  And these  are often  the very people  who have just 
correctly explained how indexation preserves real buying power. Money 
illusion  would be an insubstantial factor in public resistance  to index- 
ation if it were nothing more than an impulsive  response or a tendency 
to make mistakes in answering simple questions.  In fact, it is probably 
important because it supports other judgments about the value of index- 
ation. 
Notable  among  the popular notions  that reduce the impact of  pro- 
posals for indexation is a widespread lack of appreciation of the poten- 
tial uncertainty of  inflation.  The risk that the price level  will  be very 
different  than predicted ten years hence  is not prominent in people's 
minds; people  give  low  estimates  of this uncertainty,  even  in a high- 
inflation country such as Turkey.  This  may be partly due to self-cen- 
sorship by opinion  leaders.  It might be thought that describing  high- 
inflation scenarios that are of low or moderate probability is not appro- 
priate for normal public  discourse.  Perhaps opinion  leaders  fear that 
they will be seen as shouting fire in a crowded theatre and as promoting 
the  very  inflation  that is  feared.  When  experts  are  silent  about  the 
potential for bad inflationary outcomes,  it is natural that people  might 
forget about these possibilities. 
People  tend to think of inflation not as causing  arbitrary redistribu- 
tions  from debtors to creditors,  but as an insidious  disease  that harms 
virtually  everyone.  They  tend to believe  that individual  real incomes 
are massively  eroded by high inflation,  harming debtors and creditors, 
firms and individuals.  Thus another factor reducing public support for 
indexation  is the expectation  that indexed  payments will  be very hard 
to meet,  should there be a lot of inflation. In the divorce court, it seems 
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greatly increased payments if inflation picks up a lot. In labor-manage- 
ment disputes,  it seems too much to ask that companies  increase wages 
by the full  amount dictated by indexation  if there is a lot of inflation. 
As regards private defined benefit pension plans, employees  might think 
it reasonable that their real benefits should decline  if inflation picks up 
and harms the company that they work for. 
It is not clear that people  are entirely in error to think of inflation in 
these  terms.  Historically,  inflation  has tended  to  pick  up in  decades 
when  the real economy  is  growing  less  fast,  as students of  economic 
growth  theory  show.45 Table  1 reports correlations  between  inflation 
rates and growth rates of real GDP.  Fourteen of the sixteen  estimated 
correlation  coefficients  are negative,  partly due  to  the  fact  that the 
productivity  slowdown  that started in the  1970s  coincided  with a ten- 
dency toward higher inflation in many countries.  Thus unusually infla- 
tionary times  have tended also  to be bad times  for the real economy. 
Few  economists  seem  to be  so  aware of  this tendency  as the general 
public.  There is  no clear theory to support such a strong correlation, 
and the past correlation may be due to particular circumstances that will 
not be replicated in the future. In a study comparing economists'  views 
of inflation with those of the public,  I find that the economists'  answers 
tended to imply  that they viewed  inflation as merely redistributing in- 
come  from  creditors  to  debtors,  much  more  than  as  causing  major 
systemic  problems.46 
The lack of public enthusiasm for indexation is probably also largely 
due to the impression  that indexation  has never been a serious topic of 
discussion.  Despite  the survey's  failure to find that math anxiety  is an 
important issue,  I still think that this has inhibited public discussion  of 
indexation.  One finds scant mention  of  inflation risk or indexation  in 
popular books of financial advice,  and one has the sense that the author 
who does  mention the topic perceives  difficulty  in sustaining the read- 
er's interest. Try bringing up personal risk management through index- 
ation at a dinner party and the reaction  is  likely  to be as if the topic 
were out of bounds,  too obscure or technical.  Indeed,  such an idea is 
likely  to provoke laughter.  By contrast,  imagine  how different the re- 
ception would be of an apparently informed and forceful opinion about 
45.  See,  for example,  Bruno (1995). 
46.  Shiller  (1997). 208  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1997 
the future direction of the stock market. The public does not react with 
equal interest to all topics  in economics  and risk management through 
indexation  must rank low on the list. 
Another factor that does  appear to contribute to public resistance  to 
indexation is the notion that the government might not really allow the 
effects  of the contract to unfold as planned.  This is probably a source 
of public apathy toward many kinds of long-term planning. 
Not  all  of  the  suggestions  that emerged  from the individual  inter- 
views  as to why  people  are so indifferent  to indexation  are sustained 
by the results of the questionnaires.  The written results do not seem to 
support the hypotheses  that people  do not understand the implications 
of  concave  utility  functions,  that they  are prejudiced against indexed 
instruments as inherently paying a lower return, or that they have social 
feelings  that reduce their urgency to deal with inflation.  It is,  probably 
premature, however,  to rule out these ideas altogether. 
People  in both the United  States and Turkey do seem to trust price 
indexes  in one sense: many have a fatalistic  belief  that nothing can be 
done to escape  the inflation that is measured.  Some  do express doubts 
that indexation will work correctly in their own cases,  fearing that prices 
of the goods  that they buy will  not move with measured inflation.  It is 
plausible  that  such  doubts  prey  on  the  minds  of  more  people  than 
express them and may inhibit action, even though the survey finds that, 
by and large,  people do believe  the government's  inflation numbers, at 
least in normal times. 
The evidence  presented here is not entirely negative about the poten- 
tial for public  acceptance  of  indexation  schemes.  It is  important that 
questionnaire  respondents  seemed  largely  to  accept  indexation  after 
having worked problems on it. If opinion leaders come across strongly 
for indexation,  emphasizing  that there is  still  substantial risk of  high 
inflation in the future and that unexpected  inflation causes unnecessary 
and arbitrary redistributions,  one  might expect  to see  stronger public 
support for such schemes. 
One problem for advocates  of indexation  is that much of the advice 
that they give  has to be rather complicated.  Experts cannot endorse all 
indexed  contracts;  indeed,  in  a period  of  economic  transition,  when 
indexation becomes  more prominent, many parties will try to use public 
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beneficial when it is the outcome of all parties wrestling with the ad- 
vantages and disadvantages  offered by contracting  in real terms. 
The indexed  government  debt  offered  by the United  States  in January 
1997 illustrates  well the complexity of the message that must be given 
to the public. Certainly, experts should not recommend  that everyone 
invest for their retirement  in this debt without  regard  for its yield. The 
government  might issue so few of these bonds that  they are overpriced. 
Moreover,  modern  portfolio  theory  does not say that  people should  save 
only with indexed  bonds, but argues  that  sophisticated  investors  should 
try to hold a market  portfolio, using indexed bonds, as the risk-free 
rate, only to adjust the level of risk in their portfolio to their own 
preferences.  Exclusive reliance  on indexed  bonds for retirement  is sim- 
ple advice that would only be appropriate  for people who are not com- 
fortable  with portfolio investing. This is a complicated  message, and I 
do not think that it has ever been conveyed effectively in the media. 
Matters  become even more complicated  if one tries to advise people 
to take the optimal  strategy  to hedge their  other  economic risks. People 
who believe that  the past negative correlation  between  inflation  and  real 
income growth can be extrapolated  might try to use nominal  contracts 
to hedge real income risk.47  If people in one country  wanted  to exploit 
this correlation  and use nominal  debt as a vehicle for international  risk 
sharing,  they would not take on all sorts  of nominal  long-term  contracts 
with others in their own countries, as seems to be the case at present. 
Rather,  people in one country  would short  their  own country's  nominal 
debt and go long foreign countries' nominal debt-hardly  a common 
practice  today. This scenario  suggests some moral  hazard  issues, since 
governments  can create inflation whenever they want it. The optimal 
management  of income risk is a very complex matter  for which there 
are no obvious prescriptions. 
But although it cannot simply be said that indexed contracts are 
always better  than  unindexed  contracts  for all parties, the message that 
a better  deal can be struck  between parties  with indexed contracts  than 
those with nominal contracts  ought not to be too difficult to get across 
to the public, if it is done in a sufficiently cookbook fashion, spelling 
47.  Kim (1996) argues, based on a theory  originated  by Lucas (1982), that people 
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out what is commonly  accepted as good procedure. Most people  adopt 
contracts that they believe  are standard, trusting to the wisdom of oth- 
ers, and if better provisions  come to be accepted as the standard, these 
will  be used. 
A  pessimistic  view  of  the  prospects  for  widespread  indexation  of 
contracts may be warranted, but one  should not give  up all hope that 
substantial indexation might somehow  be promoted. It may be realistic 
to hope that in coming  decades,  current plans might result in a greater 
proportion of  the U.S.  national  debt being  indexed  than the roughly 
15 percent that is indexed in the United Kingdom.48 The United States 
is  a powerful  force  in international public  opinion,  and it is  possible 
that the initial  steps  taken by the U.S.  Treasury will  motivate  public 
discourse  in a more effective  way  than have  the prior steps taken by 
many foreign  governments.  One can hope that the example  set by the 
United  States may spill over to create a more widespread view  around 
the world that indexation  is a sound idea. 
Rather than pinning one's  hopes on such a possibility,  however,  one 
should think of some more radical steps that might be taken to promote 
indexation.  Since  government officials  apparently cannot commit their 
successors  not to inflate the currency in the future, it is important for 
governments to encourage the formulation of contracts that protect peo- 
ple against such contingencies.  The evidence  from this survey suggests 
that this  is  better done  more transparently than indexation  is  usually 
described.  The public could be encouraged to write contracts in terms 
of a "real dollar"  or a "contract dollar,"  thereby cutting out the math 
anxiety issue  induced by index numbers, reframing the discussion  sol- 
idly in real terms, and perhaps making it seem less likely that contracts 
will  be  frustrated by future government  actions.  This  is  an old  idea, 
anticipated in the "compensated  dollar"  proposed by Simon Newcomb 
and Irving Fisher.49 It has been  implemented  in Chile,  with a unit of 
account called the unidad de fomento (UF),  which is tied to a consumer 
price index.  Chilean prices are often quoted in UF. Such efforts to help 
the  public  with  the  concept  of  indexation  might  ultimately  produce 
much wider acceptance. 
The most important step that can be taken to encourage the public to 
48.  See Campbell  and Shiller  (1996). 
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accept economists'  advice  and index various long-term contracts is to 
institutionalize  the practice,  write it into codes  or standard procedures, 
as Jevons  essentially  argued  in  1875.  One  could,  indeed,  follow 
Jevons's  proposal-although  it seems  quite a radical step-and  pass a 
law stating that all long-term contracts drawn up after a given date will 
automatically  be indexed,  unless they explicitly  specify  otherwise. 
Governments have occasionally  shown willingness  to issue  indexed 
debt,  but they have not done more than offer  it.  A bolder step would 
be to eliminate  long-term government nominal debt entirely,  replacing 
it  with  indexed  debt.  The  effect  would  be  dramatic  in  encouraging 
public  acceptance  of  indexed  debt: this  would  become  the  standard. 
Congress could legislate  penalties (such as the partial withdrawal of tax 
exemptions)  for  pension  plans  that offered  fixed  nominal  retirement 
annuities,  encouraging  them  to  substitute  indexed  annuities.  Courts 
could  routinely  index  alimony,  child  support,  and personal  damages 
settlements.  For most of these  applications,  it would  be best to index 
to an income  aggregate,  such as national income,  rather than the CPI, 
because  of income's  better risk-sharing properties.50 
Other efforts  to  institutionalize  indexation  could  include  indexing 
wages  and salaries,  although the case  for this idea is perhaps not very 
strong,  since,  as noted  above,  labor negotiations  are complicated  by 
strong  emotions  and rivalrous  comparisons  that make  for downward 
rigidity  in quoted  wages.  While  I believe  that it is  very  important to 
encourage  indexation,  the example  of  labor markets suggests  that the 
methods should be chosen  with care. 
50.  See Shiller and Schneider (1995).  See also Brainard and Dolbear (1971),  Fischer 
(1983b),  Merton (1983),  and Shiller  (1993). Comments 
and Discussion 
Charles  L.  Schultze:  This paper reports and interprets the results of a 
survey carefully designed to dig out the reasons why people do not "see 
the  error of  their  ways  and  start routinely  indexing  long-term  con- 
tracts. " Many of the questions in the survey are ingeniously  constructed 
to test various hypotheses  about why  indexation  is not more popular. 
The responses  and Shiller's  analysis  provide useful  insights  into peo- 
ple's  attitudes on indexation  and inflation,  and offer  some  thoughtful 
explanations  of what lies  behind them.  In the end,  Shiller is so pessi- 
mistic about the unwillingness  of the private sector to adopt indexation 
for contracts,  but so convinced  of its welfare-improving  consequences, 
that he proposes  a series  of fairly radical governmental  mandates and 
incentives  to pull the public, kicking and screaming, toward widespread 
indexation. 
I concentrate  on two  issues  arising from the paper. First,  Shiller's 
survey actually demonstrates substantial support for indexation among 
those at the receiving  end of payments-the  demand side of the market 
for indexation.  The resistance to indexation probably stems chiefly from 
the  supply  side-the  potential  issuers  of  indexed  obligations.  Their 
views  are not represented in the survey.  Second,  I suggest  some of the 
potential costs of indexation.  The immediate impact of those costs falls 
on the suppliers of indexed obligations  and may explain their resistance 
to indexation.  The existence  of such costs  should also be seen as qual- 
ifications  to Shiller's  conclusions  about the desirability  of almost uni- 
versal indexation. 
212 Robert  J. Shiller  213 
The Demand for  Indexed Obligations 
It is my reading of the answers to Shiller's  survey that those who are 
on the receiving  side  of  long-term  obligations  are quite supportive of 
indexation.  Of the twenty-one  questions in the survey, only one directly 
asks how people  feel  about indexation.  The USA-A  group of respon- 
dents was  asked to choose  between  a pension  stream whose  nominal 
annual value  would  grow  at the inflation rate expected  by  experts- 
namely,  3  percent  a  year-and  another  stream  starting  at the  same 
nominal value but indexed to the consumer price index.  Sixty-five  per- 
cent of the respondents chose  the indexed  stream, compared with only 
29  percent who  picked  the fixed nominal  stream (7 percent answered 
that they did not know or were indifferent)-a  majority for indexation 
of 2 /4 to  1. 
The  USA-B  group  was  asked  the  same  question,  except  that the 
inflation rate expected  by experts  is  10 percent a year.  In this group, 
only 47 percent picked the indexed plan and 44 percent chose the steady 
nominal  stream. But,  as Shiller notes,  the most common  reason given 
by those in the USA-B  group for rejecting the indexed scheme was that 
they thought the  10 percent expected  inflation rate too high,  given  the 
current rate of  less  than 3 percent.  Economists  are trained to think in 
terms of unrealistic hypotheticals:  assume an economy  of perfect com- 
petition or a perfect capital market. But even well-educated  lay people 
are  much  less  accustomed  to  making  trade-offs  between  unrealistic 
hypotheticals  in an unfamiliar field.  And so a number of respondents, 
quite  naturally,  found  a guarantee of  10 percent  annual increases  in 
pension benefits a much better deal than an indexed stream. It is almost 
surely true that had the USA-B  group been given the question with the 
3 percent inflation forecast,  a much bigger majority would have chosen 
indexation. 
This  interpretation  is  strengthened  by  the  Turkish  response.  The 
Turkish alternative was posed  as a choice  between  a pension  growing 
at a forecasted inflation rate of 25 percent a year and an indexed system. 
Given the history of inflation over the past two decades  in Turkey,  25 
percent appears an unrealistically  low inflation forecast. And so Turkish 
respondents  favored  the indexed  system  by an overwhelming  85 to 9 
percent margin. It may be partly coincidental,  but is nevertheless  sug- 
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that was  18 percent  lower  than that of  the USA-A  group,  while  the 
Turkish group had a majority for indexation 20 percent higher than that 
of  the  USA-A  group.  When  the  question  is  posed  in terms of  what 
respondents  believe  to  be  a realistic  expected  rate of  inflation,  they 
consistently  prefer indexation by a quite substantial majority, probably 
about two to one. 
An analogous  question could have been posed about indexed bonds, 
asking for a choice between indexed and nonindexed streams of income. 
It is most likely  that respondents,  in their role as bond buyers,  would 
have shown a hefty majority for indexed bonds,  as they did in the case 
of pensions. 
There are several aspects of the paper that, at first reading,  make it 
appear more pessimistic  about demand-side attitudes toward indexation 
than may really be warranted. For example,  substantial space is devoted 
to exploring  the implications  of three questions on which a majority or 
plurality expressed  the beliefs  that the official  price indexes  might be 
rigged  by the government,  would  fail to mirror their own experience, 
or would become a worse measure of inflation when inflation was high. ' 
And another question  elicited  the response  that, confronted  with high 
inflation,  the government would somehow  weasel  out of its obligation. 
Given  these  suspicions,  the  choice  of  indexation  by  a two-to-one 
majority  should  be taken as a particularly strong endorsement  of  the 
concept. 
The Supply of Indexed Obligations 
The chief  barrier to a more widespread use of indexation apparently 
does not lie with the potential recipients of indexed payments.  Rather, 
it comes  from the potential  suppliers,  whose  views  were not included 
in  Shiller's  survey.  In the  short and intermediate  run, the issuers  of 
indexed  obligations  incur risk-bearing  costs.  These  costs  will  be  re- 
flected in the price of the obligations  being issued.  Had the costs  been 
explicitly  reflected in the comparisons presented to survey respondents, 
the  vote  for  the  indexed  alternative  would  presumably  have  been 
lower-but  then,  the puzzle  would have partially disappeared. 
1.  The USA-B  group was evenly  split on the issue of whether the official  price index 
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INDEXED BONDS.  Underlying the questions that Shiller poses in his 
survey and also his policy proposals  is the view that except for wages, 
indexation  has no costs. In a world where all surprises  were nominal 
shocks of the immaculate  conception  type-that  is, a monetary  disturb- 
ance leads to a quick, simultaneous, and equal change in the level or 
rate of inflation  in all prices-there  would indeed be no costs to index- 
ation for either  party  to long-term  contracts,  only risk-reducing  welfare 
gains. But the literature  has long recognized that in the case of supply 
shocks, indexation  can increase the risks borne by issuers of inflation 
guarantees  and  can therefore  be costly. The discussion has usually been 
carried  on in the context of evaluating  the indexation  of wages, but it 
also applies, with differing degrees of importance, to other types of 
indexation. 
Take the case of  indexing a private bond issue. There are three 
reasons why indexation  might increase  the risks faced by a firm. First, 
some inflation surprises  originate from supply shocks. In such cases, 
the increase in average product  prices that gives rise to an additional 
nominal obligation under  indexation  will not be matched  by an equiv- 
alent increase  in a firm's ability to pay. Second, monetary  shocks work 
their way through  the economy by complex processes, which, in the 
transition  period, may involve substantial  changes in the relative  prices 
and  fortunes  of individual  firms. Moreover,  during  periods  of moderate 
inflation, a large positive inflation surprise  is more likely than a large 
negative one. For a while, an increase  in nominal  obligations need not 
be matched  by an increase in ability to pay. Ultimately, with a purely 
monetary shock, the change in monetary obligations and resources 
should match, but the indexing firm could face a temporary cash 
squeeze. 
Third, experience teaches that there is often a substantial  negative 
covariance between large inflations and the fortunes of firms. In the 
medium  run, equity prices seem to be negatively correlated  with infla- 
tion.2  This is partly  because of the non-neutral  effect of inflation  on the 
effective tax rate on capital income (which could be fixed if the tax 
system were also fully indexed, although  at the cost of some substantial 
complexities). But even without  the tax effect, there would be a nega- 
tive correlation  between inflation  and equity values, reflecting  the fact 
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that substantial inflation surprises-whether  originating  in nominal or 
real shocks-eventually  bring on Federal Reserve  stringency  accom- 
panied by a period of unused capacity and depressed profits. It may be 
a coincidence  that the period of high inflation in the United States from 
1968 to 1982 was accompanied by a fourteen-year bear market in stocks 
and  an  almost  steady  decline  in  the  before-tax  return on  corporate 
capital-but  I do not think so. 
Indexation  adds to the risks of  firms issuing  obligations  that come 
due over the short and medium run, and so has a cost to private issuers, 
which  must be expected  to affect  the real yield  negatively.  Buyers  of 
private bonds,  in fact,  face  not  a costless  trade-off  between  indexed 
and unindexed  isues,  but a choice  between  the risk reduction afforded 
by  indexed  bonds  and a higher expected  real yield  on the unindexed 
bonds.  Surely  it is  not correct to argue that indexing  such long-term 
contracts is costless  and ought to be universally  adopted. 
This  logic  obviously  does  not imply  that firms should  issue  no in- 
dexed bonds. As one element in a financial plan, indexing some fraction 
of fixed liabilities  might make sense  for a firm, both to take advantage 
of the dispersion  of risk preferences  and inflation forecasts  among po- 
tential buyers and because,  in the longer-run, the neutral money  shock 
components  of  inflation  should  dominate  transitory  and  supply-side 
phenomena. 
The  fact  that there  have  been  so  few  private  indexed  issues  is  a 
puzzle.  In a 1983 article,  Lawrence Summers shows  that during most 
of  the  period  from  the  Civil  War to  the  inflation  of  the  late  1960s, 
nominal bond yields were far too stable to have incorporated a premium 
systematically  reflecting the fluctuations in expected  inflation.3 And in 
the sustained inflation of the 1970s, supply-side  shocks were prominent, 
reducing  the  attractiveness  of  indexed  bonds  to  potential  issuers.  I 
suspect  that these  two  phenomena  may,  in part, explain  the rarity of 
indexed  private bonds. 
Those who take on such long-term obligations  as alimony face some- 
what the  same  problem  as bond  issuers.  To  the extent  that inflation 
surprises are purely monetary in origin,  so that all relative  factor and 
output prices stay unchanged,  indexation  would be welfare-improving 
for  both  parties.  But  in  the  short  and  intermediate  run,  inflation  is 
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sometimes  far from neutral with respect to relative prices and inflation 
risks may not be symmetrical.  While indexation that costs the recipient 
nothing may be unambiguously  welfare-improving  for that recipient,  it 
can be risk-increasing  for the payer. 
PRIVATE  PENSIONS.  I  confine  my  attention  here  to  the  question  of 
indexing  pensions  during a worker's  retirement years.4 Few,  if  any, 
private pension  plans provide  a nominal  annual benefit that increases 
each  year by a fixed  amount,  according  to the inflation rate expected 
when the pension begins.  Rather, most pension plans simply provide a 
fixed  nominal  annual  amount,  whose  magnitude  is  determined  in  a 
variety  of  ways  (although  during  the  high-inflation  years  1977-82, 
about half of large and mid-sized  firms did grant increases  to cover  at 
least a modest fraction of the inflation that had occured).  But for sim- 
plicity,  assume that one is comparing an indexed plan and an unindexed 
plan of equal nominal  expected  present value,  when calculated  at the 
expected  rate of inflation. 
Currently, a private firm could match its indexed pension obligations 
with an appropriate accumulation of indexed Treasury bonds and, to a 
first approximation,  avoid any increased risk.  But if,  like most firms, 
it prefers to fund its pension  plan with a mixed portfolio  that includes 
private  stocks  and bonds,  indexing  the  plan could  put it in  a worse 
position  in  terms  of  the  trade-off  between  risk  and returns.  Even  if 
private indexed  bonds were available,  for the reasons discussed  above 
there would  be some  cost,  by way of  a lower real return. And stocks 
are not a good  hedge  for inflation in the short and intermediate term. 
The schedule  of risk-return opportunities for funding the indexed obli- 
gations  would pivot in an unfavorable direction.  And to the extent the 
firm's  pension  plan is  not fully  funded,  the risks associated  with  the 
residual  obligation  will  tend to  increase,  for the three reasons  listed 
above  in  the  discussion  of  the  costs  of  indexed  bonds.  The  cost  of 
providing  the  indexed  plan  would  rise,  and presumably  this  would 
eventually  be reflected in the compensation  package.  On balance,  the 
change  might still be worthwhile  from the pensioners'  viewpoint,  but 
it may not be costless. 
4.  Munnell  (1979)  spells  out  the  significant  difficulties  faced  by  private  firms  in 
providing inflation protection in pension formulas during the working life of an individ- 
ual,  given  the substantial number of job changes  that the typical  worker makes during 
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The  situation  is yet  more complicated.  Inflation is only  one of  the 
portfolio risks that retirees face.  As Summers has pointed out, retirees 
ought to be interested in optimizing  the real risk-return characteristics 
of their overall  portfolios  in the light of their own  preferences.  If the 
inflation risk associated  with their pensions  is removed by indexation, 
they will wish to add risk elsewhere,  so as to shift their portfolios  back 
toward  the  old  risk-return balance.5  But  for  the  many  retirees  with 
limited nonpension  assets,  that may be a very circumscribed option. 
In sum, given the existence  of a basic social security pension indexed 
to inflation, public policy  ought not to be devising  tax penalties to push 
private firms with defined benefit pension plans toward inflation index- 
ing,  as Shiller  urges.  Rather, it should encourage  the continuation  of 
the current shift toward defined contribution plans, under which retirees 
can optimize  across  a wide  range of  risk-return options,  presumably 
with safeguards against hasty and uninformed actions.  Their portfolios 
could certainly  include  indexed Treasury securities.  As a side benefit, 
defined  contribution  pension  plans would  greatly  simplify  the task of 
making pensions  portable for a mobile  work force. 
Some Final  Thoughts 
Shiller  recognizes  that indexing  wages  could  cause  some  problems 
and excludes  wages  from his otherwise universal recommendations  for 
indexation.  But it is certainly  possible  that if public policy  were suc- 
cessful  in getting the public to think exclusively  in terms of indexation, 
this habit of thought would affect the attitudes about wages that underlie 
the informal and implicit contracts governing  longer-term employment 
relationships.  The  fact that in the American  economy  real wage  cuts 
are accepted through inflation erosion,  in circumstances where nominal 
cuts are strongly resisted,  provides flexibility  in relative real wages that 
keeps  the nonaccelerating  inflation  rate of  unemployment  lower  than 
that in Europe, where workers do think more explicitly  in indexed terms 
and where resistance  to wage cuts takes the form of real wage rigidity. 
As  an aside,  Shiller  suggests  in  his  penultimate  paragraph that it 
would  be preferable to index  many types  of  long-term  obligations  to 
national  income  rather than to  prices.  Indexing  payment  streams  to 
national income  would require issuers of indexed obligations  to hedge 
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them in a thick and well-developed worldwide market for income 
claims. I have neither the time nor the necessary familiarity  with the 
recent literature  on the creation  of macromarkets,  some of it produced 
by Shiller himself, to deal with this issue. But my cursory  look at some 
of this literature  suggests that if one waits until such markets  develop, 
indexation  will be a long time coming. On balance, Shiller successfully 
makes the case that the indexation  of long-term  obligations is too little 
practised. But he overstates the potential net benefits from the spread 
of indexation  and his policy proposals  go too far. 
Robert E. Hall: In this paper,  Robert  Shiller bravely  tackles an impor- 
tant  piece of the puzzle of nominal  contracting.  He asks why contracts 
are so often stated in monetary  terms when, over history, almost every 
monetary  unit has been drastically  unstable. Indexation  of contracts  to 
the cost of living provides a simple and inexpensive way around  the 
perils of the nominal contract, yet surprisingly  few contracts are in- 
dexed. Shiller brings a lot of new evidence to the discussion. 
This issue divides the Woodward-Hall  household. Susan Woodward 
has worked hard to build the infrastructure  for indexation, especially 
in the key area  of mortgages,  whereas  I have put  my efforts into pushing 
schemes to make the dollar so stable that indexation  would be unnec- 
essary. One or the other should be out of this business within the next 
decade. 
The most interesting  findings of Shiller's paper  are as follows: 
-Over  the horizon relevant for personal financial planning-ten, 
twenty, or more years-dispersion  in the price level has historically 
been huge in both the United States and Turkey (see table 1). Never- 
theless, people seem to believe that  prospective  dispersion  will be tiny 
(see questions 14A, 14B). 
-Indexation  is close to costless. There are no significant  legal bar- 
riers. People understand  inflation  and indexation. They do not see the 
mathematics  as a serious obstacle. They strongly prefer indexation  in 
an abstract  hypothetical  setting, when the choice is fair. 
-People  see graduation-adjustment  for expected  future  inflation- 
as an important  part  of the benefit of indexation, as one would expect, 
given their understatement  of uncertainty  about inflation. 
-Other  than  TIPS (the new indexed bonds sold by the U.S. Treas- 
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or in Turkey. Indexation of wages  is a familiar idea, but the practice is 
rare in the United States today. By far the biggest element of indexation 
in the U.S.  economy  is social  security payments. 
-The  recently  issued TIPS are held not by individuals but by insti- 
tutions. 
-In  both the United States and Turkey, people  use short-term con- 
tracts with frequent renegotiation  in circumstances  where long-run in- 
dexed contracts would serve their purposes better. 
-People  trust the dollar, and even the Turkish lira, and are skeptical 
that the cost of living  will be properly measured or that the government 
would  permit the large  adjustments that would  occur  in highly  infla- 
tionary times. 
-As  is apparent in Shiller's  earlier work,  the public holds  a com- 
pletely  different  view  of  inflation  from a monetary economist.  In the 
public's  view,  inflation  occurs  when  the economy  falls  apart and all 
groups  suffer  lower  real income.  In particular,  wages  do  not rise  in 
parallel with prices. 
Shiller's  most important conclusion,  by far, is that the public grossly 
understates the prospective  dispersion  of the price level.  This  misun- 
derstanding is the biggest  obstacle  to indexation:  the public  seriously 
underestimates  the prospective  benefits of indexation.  Another impor- 
tant conclusion  is that indexed  debt and other indexed  contracts lack 
credibility.  Shiller's  analysis  also emphasizes  that the government and 
personal  financial  advisers  do  not push indexation  as the  solution  to 
personal  financial  problems.  The  bottom  line  is  that there should  be 
much more aggressive  federal sponsorship of widespread indexation to 
correct the public's  ignorant lack of  interest.  The government  should 
introduce  an unidad de  fomento,  like  that in  Chile.  All  federal  debt 
should be indexed. 
Shiller's  discussion  of the unidad de fomento  is commendable,  but 
he should have given it more attention. The UF has delivered effortless 
indexation  of  all forward transactions in Chile.  In brief,  the UF is an 
abstract monetary unit without any corresponding medium of exchange. 
Transactions are carried out in pesos,  which are provided by a standard 
central bank setup.  The UF is defined as enough pesos  to buy the cost 
of  living  bundle.  Each  day,  a box  in  the  lower  right  corner  of  the 
financial page of every Chilean newspaper reports the day's  peso con- 
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UF's-savings  accounts,  leases,  employment  contracts,  mortgages, 
and so forth. When the time comes to make a payment on an obligation, 
the UF amount is multiplied by that day's  peso content of the UF,  and 
the payment  is  made in pesos.  The  Chilean  public  shifted  quickly  to 
the system in 1980 and has used it ever since.  The UF's  character as a 
monetary unit rather than an indexation scheme is apparently the secret 
of its success.  Why does the public accept an alternative real monetary 
unit so easily  when indexation is such a hard sell? It is equally difficult 
to say why the system has not been adopted in any other country. During 
recent  monetary  reforms  in  Argentina  and Brazil,  there  was  public 
debate on adopting a unidad de fomento,  but I believe  that Chile is still 
the only country enjoying  the benefits of easy universal indexation. 
Shiller concentrates  on individual  views  about inflation and the po- 
tential safeguard from indexation.  It is worth mentioning how different 
the  situation  is  at the business  level.  Indexation  is  the rule,  not  the 
exception,  in business-to-business  contracts. CPI indexation is rare, but 
indexation  to cost  indexes  for suppliers is close  to universal  in longer 
term contracts. 
Shiller  focuses  on  the  general  public  and its  devotion  to  nominal 
forward contracts.  Other pockets  of devotion  also provide obstacles  to 
indexation.  Bankers  have  huge  amounts of  experience  with  nominal 
deals and none with real ones.  And, as Shiller notes but does not pursue, 
the financial press is an absolutely  consistent  source of misinformation 
about indexation. 
He is persuasive  that public  demand will  not deliver  beneficial  in- 
dexation  in the United  States,  nor even  in Turkey.  He gives  too  little 
attention to push from the suppliers of indexed financial arrangements. 
Here, the history of adjustable rate mortgages is instructive. Prospective 
homeowners  did  not  go  to  banks  and ask  for  mortgages  indexed  to 
interest rates. The public has always favored fixed-rate mortgages with 
the same determination that Shiller shows  it favors nominal rather than 
real payments.  Adjustable  rate mortgages  were pushed into the mort- 
gage  market by  institutions  that found  it profitable to originate  them 
and then  package  them  for  the  secondary  market.  The  same  would 
happen with mortgages  indexed to price levels. 
Shiller downplays  indexation issues  in pensions.  First, his statement 
that military pensions  and social  security payments alone  are indexed 
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retirement benefits to final-year earnings.  Also,  many firms make ad- 
justments to benefits on the basis of subsequent inflation,  even though 
there is no contractual requirement to do so.  As a result, pension funds 
are the natural purchasers of indexed government debt, in order to hedge 
their real pension  obligations. 
As  Shiller's  work shows-both  in this and earlier papers-Ameri- 
cans  love  the dollar.  They  use  it excessively.  Shiller's  answer to the 
public's  resistance  to indexation  is a huge national investment  in cre- 
ating  indexed  financial  products  and training  people  to  use  them  as 
alternatives to the dollar. Surely an American unidad de fomento should 
be considered as an alternative. But there is also another answer: change 
the dollar so that it provides the benefits of indexation without altering 
the characteristics that are comfortable and familiar to the public.  Alan 
Greenspan has made a lot of progress  along these  lines.  Shiller  quite 
properly stresses  uncertainty about the purchasing power of the dollar 
over  intervals  of  decades.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  Federal 
Reserve's  ability  to stabilize  the dollar to the extent  that the twenty- 
year-ahead conditional  distribution of the CPI has a mean equal to the 
current value of the CPI and a standard deviation of less than 4 percent. 
In other words,  it is easily  within the Fed's  grasp to validate the tight 
conditional  distribution that people  actually hold,  despite its historical 
inaccuracy.  It would  be a mistake  for the Fed to promise to keep the 
price level close to a prescribed target each year-because  of occasional 
inflationary shocks-but  it would be reasonable to ask the Fed to nudge 
the price level  back toward target each year,  so that the twenty-year- 
ahead conditional  distribution has a mean equal to the target level  and 
little dispersion.  The Greenspan Fed is coming  close  to this ideal. 
The real problem-as  Shiller is obviously  aware-is  that there is no 
guarantee that the Fed will  not fall back into the hands of the kind of 
people  who permitted the extreme dispersion  of the price level  shown 
in table  1. The public's  suspicion  about the viability  of  indexation  is 
supported by one important episode  in U.S.  history: in  1933 the gov- 
ernment removed  indexation  provisions  from  private contracts;  gold 
clauses,  which effectively  caused future payments to be made in gold, 
were  invalidated  in contracts  already in effect  and prohibited in new 
contracts.  Note  that the issue  in this case  is a little different from the 
main concern that Shiller considers: the shielding of debtors is common 
to both,  but not the removal of cost of living  indexation.  Respondents Robert  J. Shiller  223 
to his survey doubt that the government  would permit  the increase in 
the burden  on debtors that indexation would bring in the case of high 
inflation. In 1933 the government  did not permit the increase in the 
burden  on debtors that would have occurred  as a result of an increase 
in the dollar price of gold. Had contracts  been indexed to the cost of 
living rather  than to gold, indexation would have protected debtors, 
and surely the government  would not have stepped in. 
Shiller's paper invites dabbling in explanations  of the public's de- 
votion to the national  monetary  unit, and  I cannot  resist. First, I reiterate 
the importance  of his point that the public constantly hears that the 
dollar is the right way to think about future value and is hardly ever 
taught  to think  in real terms. One of the first  steps in teaching  intertem- 
poral  economics is to get students  out of this mode, so grown-up  econ- 
omists cannot understand  why the public thinks differently. Second, 
the public sees the monetary  unit of value in just the same light as other 
publicly defined units of weight and measure. Even economists would 
have trouble switching to a world where the length of the mile, the 
weight of a pound, and the duration  of an hour were determined  as 
policy  variables and had huge amounts of dispersion over ten- or 
twenty-year periods. If these units were unstable, the Shillers (and 
Woodwards)  of the profession would advocate the indexation  of con- 
tracts  stated  in miles, pounds, or hours. But surely  our  current  approach 
is better. People write contracts in these units with no fear that they 
will change. And the public  thinks  that  the dollar  has the same property. 
So why not indulge this belief by adopting  a monetary  policy that  keeps 
the purchasing  power of the dollar  in a band  of a few percentage  points 
around  a prescribed  constant? 
General discussion: James  Duesenberry  suggested  that  one reason  why 
people may not like indexation could be confusion about whether in- 
dexation  would be full or partial;  indexing alimony  when wages are not 
indexed could increase, rather than decrease, an individual's risk. 
Shiller noted that the supposition that people dislike bond indexation 
because some of their other contracts  are not indexed is not supported 
by the survey  data:  not a single person  gave such an explanation.  Robert 
Moffitt pointed out that the indexation of child support  payments to 
inflation  would be unnecessary  if support  payments  were indexed  to the 
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such a system was inferior to indexation  because, like a tax, it would 
create adverse incentives. Benjamin  Friedman  suggested that the lack 
of markets  in indexed  securities  might  not reflect  an absence  of potential 
demand.  The standard  Wall Street  line is that securities  are not bought, 
they are sold. So the question "Why don't people want to buy indexed 
securities?" could be asked  about  any product.  The more  relevant  ques- 
tion is, "Why aren't  the issuers or the investment  bankers  pushing  this 
product?" Sales will grow only when the financial industry  devotes 
itself to making a sales pitch. He speculated that as the supply of 
indexed bonds rose, they would be appropriately  priced and marketed. 
Friedman  also mentioned  Zvi Bodie's argument  that  the inflation  risk 
facing wealth owners with long horizons can be largely eliminated  by 
investing in short-term  debt investments  and  rolling over the portfolio. 
Although that investment strategy risks changes in the real rate of 
interest, that risk is relatively minor as compared  with the risk due to 
inflation on long-term nominal bonds. Hence the value of indexation 
may be less than Shiller suggests. In a similar vein, Ben Bernanke 
noted that Shiller assumes that real bonds are strictly preferable to 
nominal bonds, which may or may not be true, depending  on the indi- 
vidual's portfolio. So the puzzle to be solved is one of a broader  set of 
portfolio puzzles, and, by his own logic, Shiller should advocate gov- 
ernment  intervention  forcing people to optimize  their  portfolios  in other 
ways, too! 
Friedman  suggested that some of the survey results about people's 
dislike of inflation could reflect the fact that to many people, "infla- 
tion"  simply means "bad times"-falling  incomes or profits or in- 
creased unemployment. If people are feeling more vulnerable these 
days, as some surveys suggest, they may be fearful of any number  of 
possible "bads."  Moffitt added that the hypothesis of workers' in- 
creased feeling of vulnerability  is consistent with actual experience, 
such as the increase  in the variance  of transitory  earnings  in the United 
States in the 1980s. 
Katherine  Abraham  was distressed by Shiller's findings of public 
distrust of government  agencies. If 45 percent of the public does not 
trust government  data, there is a major  credibility  problem. She noted 
that the BLS has instituted  many procedures  attempting  to insulate its 
statistics from politics and hoped this would assure the public that its 
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Statistics  avoids capricious  changes in methods-and  indeed, has been 
criticized  for moving  too slowly-believing  that  moving with deliberate 
speed should  help to ensure  trust  in the numbers  produced.  It should  be 
possible to encourage critical and constructive  discussion without un- 
dermining  public confidence in the data. But she wondered whether 
some of the public's current  mistrust was a spill-over from the CPI 
debate, which has grown  from  a scientific  debate  to national  news, with 
headlines announcing  deep problems with the CPI. Charles Schultze 
believed the mistrust  of government  responses  related  to government  in 
general,  and  not to a particular  agency. When  asked  whether  they would 
agree  or disagree  that the government  would make sure that no tax law 
change or other provision would ever compromise  the real purpose  of 
indexation, he did not find it surprising  that almost all respondents 
disagreed.  Jonathan  Gruber  questioned  the assumption  of Shiller's sur- 
vey that people have sufficient mathematical  ability to evaluate the 
results of inflation or indexing. He noted other surveys showing that 
around  a third  of the public cannot  add  up a restaurant  check, and  asked 
whether  those who responded  to the survey were better  educated than 
average, and hence not representative?  Shiller indicated that the re- 
spondents  were quite well educated-even  in Turkey, half the respon- 
dents had some college education. Bernanke cautioned that Islamic 
codes on the financial system may influence some of the Turkish 
answers. 
Duesenberry  urged  careful thought  about  the effect of indexation  on 
the aggregate  behavior  of the economy. If monetary  and fiscal author- 
ities are  prone  to mistakes, or the economy is subject  to external  supply 
shocks, indexation  could amplify the problem, creating a less stable, 
and  possibly more  inflationary,  economy. He noted  that  Brazil  provides 
an example of  indexation run amok. The Brazilian experience also 
raises  the question  of how indexation  would affect a government's  debt 
structure  and interest payments. Gruber  agreed that indexation might 
alter the dynamics of the economy. In his research  he has found that 
the costs of many employer mandates  from the government  are fully 
passed on to real wages, not through  nominal wage cuts but through 
price increases.  If the economy  were fully  indexed,  this method 
of passing  on costs  would  be removed.  The adjustment of  real 
wages would have to take place by some other, possibly more costly, 
mechanism. 226  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
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